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Article
Restoring Faith in Military Justice
ELEANOR T. MORALES & JOHN W. BROOKER
The military justice system was designed to maintain good order and discipline,
strengthen national security, and achieve justice. After military leaders failed to
effectively address the sexual assault crisis within the armed forces, Congress lost
faith in this system. In response, Congress enacted sweeping legislative reform,
transferring prosecutorial discretion for the most serious offenses from
commanders to military lawyers. Unlike civilian prosecutions, most decisions within
the military justice system have overwhelmingly favored one consideration:
maintaining good order and discipline in the unit. While Congress’s reforms change
who makes the decisions in many cases, they will have little effect unless military
leaders also broaden the underlying criteria upon which their recommendations and
decisions are made.
This Article proposes an innovative framework to assist military leaders in
implementing a holistic approach to decision-making. Borrowing from the law of
armed conflict, we propose a test that empowers decision makers to consider all the
federal principles of prosecution and sentencing that Congress has repeatedly
indicated should serve as touchstones for reform. When employing this framework,
military justice decision makers will better account for the long-term impact on
accused service members, society, and victims rather than solely focus on
short-term deterrence within the unit. This proposal attempts to bring military
prosecutions more in line with the criteria applied by civilian federal prosecutors
and restore credibility in the military justice system, thereby enabling it to continue
to do what it was designed to do.
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Restoring Faith in Military Justice
ELEANOR T. MORALES & JOHN W. BROOKER *
“In looking at the past 50 years, change—including
transformational change—is a recurring aspect of military
justice. Our Corps’[s] ability to successfully adapt and
execute such change has been the one constant. Even through
change, justice will prevail; the JAG Corps will excel.
Continue to perform as trusted professionals as we transform
and succeed together.” 1
INTRODUCTION
The military justice system is undergoing unprecedented
transformation. For the first time in United States history, Congress has
stripped military commanders of prosecutorial discretion for serious felony
offenses and given it to military attorneys.2 Military prosecutors are now
increasingly responsible for the administration of the military justice
system.3 Moving forward, military attorneys, not commanders, will make
nearly all prosecutorial decisions in the most serious felony-level cases.4
Prior to this legislation, only commanders exercised prosecutorial
discretion in the military justice system.5 In other words, military
* Eleanor T. Morales is an Assistant Clinical Professor of Law at Wake Forest University School
of Law. John W. Brooker is a Clinical Associate Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina
School of Law. The authors have more than three decades of combined experience in the military justice
system and currently direct law school clinics that represent former service members. We are incredibly
grateful to Ronald F. Wright, Erin C. Blondel, Ernest A. Young, Ashley H. Willard, Alyse Bertenthal,
Allyson E. Gold, and the Wake Forest University School of Law Junior Scholars group.
1 Stuart W. Risch & Michael J. Bostic, Military Justice Pursuant to the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, JAGCNET (Jan. 18, 2022, 9:43 AM),
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/Sites/JAGC.nsf/homeContent.xsp?open&documentId=86FADC1D4E17
C2A3852587CE0050DA31.
2 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, §§ 531–539G, 135
Stat. 1541, 1692 (2021) [hereinafter NDAA 2022]. The 2022 NDAA included historic military justice
reform legislation regarding how the military investigates and prosecutes certain offenses under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The UCMJ is a collection of federal laws that serves as the
code of military criminal law and procedure. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946a.
3 Claudia Grisales, Senate Panel Greenlights Military Justice Reform Bill After Years-Long Push,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 22, 2021, 10:49 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/22/1019146746/senatepanel-greenlights-military-justice-reform-bill-after-years-long-push.
4 Id.
5 A staff judge advocate could decline to refer a case to a general court-martial pursuant to Article
34 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 834(a), if they thought there was no jurisdiction or probable cause. In
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commanders—that is, most often nonlawyers—had ultimate authority to
decide what charges to bring, when to charge, and what plea terms to accept.
They could even unilaterally reduce judges’ sentences. 6 In practice,
commanders mostly followed the recommendations of the military attorneys
advising them, but sometimes they did not.7
The changes contained in the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) are unparalleled. They are fundamentally different because they do
not change the tools that those who exercise prosecutorial discretion use.8
Rather, they change who is exercising prosecutorial discretion. This transfer
of power demonstrates that Congress no longer believes that the military
justice system’s failures are caused by inadequate or antiquated laws and
procedures but are rather rooted in failures of those administering the
system. It represents the first true congressionally induced threat to the
system. Congress’s lack of faith in those exercising prosecutorial discretion
may lead it to call into question every prosecutorial decision.9
general, however, the discretion of what to do was exercised by commanders pursuant to UCMJ Articles
15 and 22–24 (10 U.S.C. §§ 815, 822–824) and military regulations, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG.
635-200, ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS (28 June 2021) [hereinafter AR
635-200]; U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-8-24, OFFICER TRANSFERS AND DISCHARGES (8 Feb. 2020)
[hereinafter AR 600-8-24].
6 10 U.S.C. § 860(c) (2012) (“The authority under this section to modify the findings and sentence
of a court-martial is a matter of command prerogative involving the sole discretion of the convening
authority.”), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 860a (Supp. IV 2017) (effective Jan. 1, 2019).
7 This assertion is based on the authors’ professional experiences in multiple roles within the U.S.
Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps.
8 For purposes of this Article, “prosecutorial discretion” includes initiating prosecution, declining
prosecution, issuing nonjudicial punishment, initiating and making final decisions on administrative
separation and other adverse administrative actions, selecting charges, entering into a plea agreement,
referring a case to court-martial, and participating in sentencing at a court-martial. This definition is
intentionally broad considering the unique features within the military justice system, which includes not
only the court-martial process but also the administrative separation process. It is important to note that
during the court-martial process, prosecutorial discretion is not executed at the preferral stage, as the
preferral, or bringing of charges, can be brought by “[a]ny person subject to the UCMJ.” MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 307 (2019) [hereinafter MCM]. Ultimately, the preferral of
charges without the referral of charges has no legal effect. Yet referral, which is the “order of a convening
authority that charges and specifications against an accused will be tried by a specified court-martial,”
has ramifications. Id. R.C.M. 601(a). In addition to the court-martial process, service members can be
administratively separated when they commit a crime in violation of the UCMJ. While there is no
equivalent in the civilian system to military administrative separations, the closest analogy is likely a due
process hearing where an employee is facing possible termination of their employment. Yet military
administrative separations are unique. During military administrative separation proceedings, a
commander exercises discretion. Additionally, when a prosecutor decides not to prosecute a crime in the
civilian world, the case is over. In contrast, in the military justice system, a nolle prosequi memo does
not mean the case is over; rather, the service member could still be administratively separated and be
issued a less-than-Honorable discharge that can have a similar impact as a punitive discharge issued at a
court-martial sentence. See infra Section II.C. As such, the authors intend the term “prosecutorial
discretion” to be used broadly to reflect the uniqueness of the military justice system.
9 See John W. Brooker, Improving Uniform Code of Military Justice Reform, 222 MIL. L. REV. 1,
55 (2014) (explaining why during times of conflict, Congress may defer to military leaders). The
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The recent sexual assault crisis in the military has led to multiple
congressional interventions in the military justice system, including the most
recent reform.10 One scholar explained that the reform “was concurrently
catalyzed by the civilian reckoning of “Me Too” and a contemporaneous
rash of highly publicized military sexual assault cases that evidenced both
procedural weaknesses and substantive inefficiencies in the military justice
system’s handling of these complaints.”11 Leading the legislative efforts,
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand of New York said in 2021, “Sexual assault in our
military is an epidemic and it’s clear that the current system is not working
for survivors.”12 Congress changed the punitive articles, pretrial and posttrial
procedures, and afforded survivors of sexual assault more resources. 13
Yet the problem within the military justice system goes beyond the
sexual assault crisis. Many scholars and critics have opined that when
exercising prosecutorial discretion, the primary, if not sole, variable that
should be considered is the potential impact on good order and discipline.14
This assertion is premised on the need for disciplined military members as
essential to fighting and winning the nation’s wars.15
There are other stated purposes, however, that should not be overlooked.
The stated purpose of military law as set forth in the Manual for
Constitution gives Congress the power to raise, support, and regulate the armed forces. U.S. CONST.
pmbl.; id. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–14. Pursuant to this authority, in 1950, Congress enacted the UCMJ, which
continues to serve as the code of military criminal law and procedure to this day. Brooker, supra, at 39.
10 Kyra Ziesk-Socolov, Two-Front War: The Struggle for Legitimacy in Military Sexual Assault
Adjudications, 44 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 101, 114–20, 130–43 (2021).
11 Id. at 103. The “Me Too” movement, an advocacy campaign created to give a voice to sexual
abuse victims, crested in a viral social media hashtag in 2017. See Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who
Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html.
12 Vanessa Romo, Defense Secretary Will Back a Seismic Shift in Prosecuting Military Sex Assault
Cases, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 23, 2021, 9:48 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/22/1009272055/
defense-secretary-says-hell-support-removing-sexual-offense-cases-from-commander.
13 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, §§ 552–553,
596, 119 Stat. 3256–64, 3282–83; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-66, §§ 1701, 1703–1705, 1722–1726, 1731–1734, 1742–1747, 1751–1752, 127 Stat. 952–54, 958–
60, 970–76, 979–84 (2013); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114328, § 5301, 130 Stat. 2919–20 (2016) [hereinafter NDAA 2017] (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 856).
14 See DAVID A. SCHLUETER & LISA M. SCHENCK, A WHITE PAPER ON AMERICAN MILITARY
JUSTICE: RETAINING THE COMMANDER’S AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE DISCIPLINE AND JUSTICE 3, 6–10
(2020), https://www.court-martial-ucmj.com/files/2020/07/White-Paper-on-Military-Justice-Reforms2020-w-App.pdf (arguing that “[i]t is critical that Congress, in considering any amendments to the
UCMJ, recall[s] that the primary function and purpose of the military justice system is to enforce good
order and discipline in the armed forces”); Dru Brenner-Beck, Assessing Guidelines and Disparity in
Military Sentencing: Vive La Différence!, 27 FED. SENT’G. REP. 108, 116 (2014); Timothy C.
MacDonnell et al., Who Should Decide: Prosecutorial Discretion and Military Justice, JUST SEC. (June
29,
2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/71112/who-should-decide-prosecutorial-discretion-andmilitary-justice/; James T. Hill, Command Prosecutorial Authority and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice—A Redoubt Against Impunity and a National Security Imperative, 228 MIL. L. REV. 473, 476
(2020).
15 SCHLUETER & SCHENCK , supra note 14, at 23.
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Courts-Martial is to “promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order
and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness
in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security
of the United States.”16
This Article argues that what is truly motivating Congress is poor
decision-making by the military leaders entrusted with the system. These
leaders often misjudge the impact an action will have on the maintenance
of good order and discipline. Further, they routinely fail to account for the
long-term impact of their decisions on accused service members, society,
and victims. 17 Decisions based solely on unarticulated estimates of the
impact on the maintenance of good order and discipline have resulted in
permanent unintended consequences that are detrimental to accused former
service members, society, and victims—and therefore to the military
justice system.
Focusing on the longer-term objective of preventing the dissolution of
the military justice system is better for good order and discipline than any
short-term gains based on general deterrence within the unit. Ironically,
the military’s myopic focus on good order and discipline, if continued, will
serve as the death knell to the very system that is best positioned to
preserve it.
This irony can be illustrated through an analogy. Consider a parent who
pushes their child to focus on one activity, like a sport or musical instrument.
This can create physical and psychological injuries that ultimately prevent
achievement of the desired goal. While a short-term view of the parent’s
efforts would appear to all observers to be a logical step in pursuit of the
ultimate goal, failing to consider all other variables creates the irony of the
short-term action actually undermining achievement of the long-term goal.18
Similarly, narrowly focusing on the short-term impact of enforcing good
order and discipline via deterrence will result in uninformed and therefore
poor decisions that will further erode congressional trust. Such a loss of trust
will lead to further intervention and possible destruction of the entire system,
ultimately undermining what the leaders set out to achieve: maintaining
good order and discipline.19

16

MCM, supra note 8, pt. 1, ¶ 3.
For purposes of this Article, the term “accused service member” is used broadly. This term
includes not only those accused of a crime in the court-martial process but also those responding to
administrative actions who also face allegations of misconduct.
18 See, e.g., Michael Rosenberg, Learning to Be Human Again, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 11,
2019), https://www.si.com/nfl/2019/01/11/todd-marinovich-dad-marv-quarterback-drugs-rehab (“Todd
Marinovich was ‘the test-tube QB’ the first half of his life, a drug addict since. Closing in on 50, the
former USC and Raiders quarterback is struggling to come to terms with his raging beast of a father—
and the big lie that he only now can share[.]”).
19 For further discussion, see Patrick P. Finnegan, Today’s Military Advocates: The Challenge of
Fulfilling Our Nation’s Expectations for a Military Justice System that Is Fair and Just, 195 MIL. L.
REV. 190, 196 (2008).
17
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Of course, good order and discipline is always a critical factor to
consider, but it is not and should not be the only variable weighed when
exercising prosecutorial discretion. Leaders must move beyond solely
considering the impact on good order and discipline when administering the
military justice system. Those exercising prosecutorial discretion must
examine cases holistically and consider the broader impact of their
decisions, including post-discharge.
Time is of the essence, as Congress will be neither patient nor forgiving
of any missteps in the execution of prosecutorial discretion within the
military justice system. Upon implementation of the 2022 NDAA,
non-attorney commanders and uniformed judge advocates (i.e., military
attorneys) will both exercise prosecutorial discretion.20 They are on
borrowed time to reach both a shared understanding of the variables
involved when making decisions and an effective approach to
decision-making.
This Article blends concepts of the law of armed conflict (LOAC)21 with
military justice to create a comprehensive and systemic methodology that
military justice decision makers,22 to strengthen national security, should
implement when exercising prosecutorial discretion. This proposed solution
employs the jus in bello (law concerning conduct during war)
proportionality test, which can be easily retooled to enable military justice
practitioners to better perform the multivariable analysis required when
exercising discretion in the military justice system.23
Without rewriting the law, the proposed test requires only slight
adjustments to current practices to adequately account for an abundance of
critical variables, so as to consider the foreseeable harms to accused service
members, society, and victims. The proposed methodology will naturally
account for the principles that govern civilian federal prosecutions and the
principles of sentencing, including general and specific deterrence,
rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation. Its use will lead to the results
Congress seeks and restore faith in military decision makers. Regaining
Congress’s trust could prevent the permanent divestiture of all prosecutorial
discretion from uniformed officers.
This Article addresses and analyzes the challenges facing the military
justice system following transformational changes resulting from the 2022
NDAA and proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the new legal landscape
under the 2022 NDAA and the underlying reason for Congress’s loss of faith
20 NDAA 2022, supra note 2, §§ 531–532, 135 Stat.at 1692–95 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 824a,
1044f); see also id. § 539c, 135 Stat. at 1699 (directing the effective date of these changes).
21 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL para. 1.3.1.2 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter LAW
OF WAR MANUAL] (“The law of war is often called the law of armed conflict.”).
22 The term “military justice decision makers” refers to commanders and uniformed judge advocates
who exercise prosecutorial discretion within the military justice system.
23 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 5.12.
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in the military justice system. Part II proposes an innovative test for military
justice decision makers to use in this new operating environment and thereby
restore legitimacy in the system. Finally, Part III applies this analysis to two
common case scenarios.
I.

THE MILITARY JUSTICE LEGITIMACY CRISIS

The military justice system has a legitimacy crisis. Numerous
incremental reforms to the system have been implemented over the last three
decades; however, they have not improved Congress’s confidence in the
institution.24 The passage of the 2022 NDAA further reflects that these
incremental changes have not gone far enough to restore Congress’s faith.
This section first describes the new operating environment of the military
justice system. Next, it explains and diagnoses the problem the military
justice system is currently facing, before proposing a solution in Part II.
A. Transfer of Prosecutorial Discretion
Prior to the 2022 NDAA, only commanders—not prosecuting
attorneys—exercised prosecutorial discretion in the military justice
system.25 Non-attorney commanders typically decided whom to prosecute
and what charges to bring, and only those commanders could send cases to
a court-martial (military trial).26 Commanders accepted offers to plead guilty
at trial, and in some cases they could even overturn a guilty verdict of a
military judge or panel (the military parallel to a jury).27
Those same commanders also exercised nearly complete discretion in
determining who was punished, and how, at lesser disciplinary and adverse
administrative actions not involving court-martial.28 They also decided who
was administratively separated from the military based upon misconduct.29
While service members have due process rights depending on the nature of

24

For an overview, see Ziesk-Socolov, supra note 10.
See supra note 5.
26 See MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 307, 401, 601. There are three levels of court-martial: summary,
special, and general. 10 U.S.C. § 816. The authorized punishments vary significantly among these three
levels of court-martial. 10 U.S.C. §§ 818–820.
27 See supra note 6.
28 10 U.S.C. § 815; MCM, supra note 8, pt. V; see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY , REG. 600-37,
UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION para. 2-5 (2 Oct. 2020) [hereinafter AR 600-37] (implementing
regulations for adverse administrative actions regarding unfavorable information in personnel files).
29 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS encl.
3, para. 11.c.6 (27 Jan. 2014) (C7, 23 June 2022) [hereinafter DoDI 1332.14]; AR 635-200, supra note
5, paras. 1-20, 14-14 (Army regulation governing administrative separations for enlisted personnel); AR
600-8-24, supra note 5, para. 4-1(e) (Army regulation governing administrative separations for officers).
25
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30

the action taken against them, the ultimate decision was almost always in
the hands of a commander.31
While commanders relied and continue to rely heavily on the judge
advocates who advise them, historically there has been little formal
guidance and training on how to exercise that discretion. 32 Commanders
remained ultimately responsible for how the military justice system
operated and its effectiveness.
Through the 2022 NDAA, Congress has implemented an
unprecedented structure in which military lawyers, not commanders, hold
prosecutorial discretion for the most serious felony offenses. 33 This stands
in stark contrast to Congress’s prior incremental changes to the system.
Those prior congressional changes include amending the punitive articles,
pretrial and posttrial procedures, and offering survivors of sexual assault
more resources. 34
Through this new legislation, Congress created new positions for
uniformed judge advocates, entitled “special trial counsel,” who will
exercise prosecutorial discretion for “covered offenses.”35 The 2022 NDAA
defines “covered offenses” as the following articles within the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ): Articles 117a (wrongful broadcast or
distribution of intimate visual images), 118 (murder), 119 (manslaughter),
120 (rape and sexual assault), 120b (rape and sexual assault of a child), 120c
(other sexual misconduct), 125 (kidnapping), 128b (domestic violence), 130
(stalking), and 132 (retaliation), and the standalone offense of possession of
child pornography under Article 134.36 “Covered offenses” also include the
inchoate offenses of conspiracy, solicitation, or attempt under Articles 81,
82, and 80 of the UCMJ, relative to the underlying offenses.37
30 10 U.S.C. § 831–832 (courts-martial); MCM, supra note 8, pt. V, ¶ 4c(1)(G) (nonjudicial
punishment); see also AR 635-200, supra note 5, paras. 2-2, 2-9 (separation notification and hearing
board procedures for enlisted personnel); AR 600-8-24, supra note 5, para. 4-11 (Army officers’ rights
amid recommendation for involuntary separation); AR 600-37, supra note 28, para. 6-3 (Army Suitability
Evaluation Board process for unfavorable information in personnel files); DoDI 1332.14, supra note 29,
encl. 3, para. 12.a.1 (due process in separation decisions for enlisted service members convicted of certain
sexual offenses).
31 See supra note 6.
32 See Brooker, supra note 9, at 118 (suggesting commanders are not properly educated on the
impacts of their discharge characterization).
33 NDAA 2022, supra note 2, § 531, 135 Stat. at 1692–94 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 824a). The
2022 NDAA also included additional changes to the military justice system, including mandating that
military judges (instead of the panel) sentence accused service members in all noncapital offenses and
directing the creation of nonbinding sentencing guidelines. § 539E, 135 Stat. at 1700–06 (to be codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 853).
34 See sources cited supra note 13.
35 NDAA 2022 § 533, 135 Stat. at 1695–96 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801).
36 Id.
37 Id. The 2022 NDAA also created a standalone punitive sexual harassment offense under Article
134 of the UCMJ. § 539D, 135 Stat. at 1699–1700 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 934). However, the 2022
NDAA does not include this new offense as a “covered offense.” § 533.
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Special trial counsels will have the exclusive authority to determine “if
a reported offense is a covered offense” and whether any other offense is
“related to the covered offense.”38 They also will have sole authority to
withdraw or dismiss charges, refer the charges for trial by special or general
court-martial, and enter into plea agreements.39 The special trial counsels
will have the final say with regard to referral decisions, as their decisions are
“binding” on the convening authority, who are senior military
commanders.40 Put another way, convening authorities no longer have the
power to refer charges for “covered offenses” to special or general
courts-martial.
Each military department will establish separate dedicated offices of
special trial counsel. 41 Notably, the lead of each office of the special trial
counsel, who will have general officer rank, will “report directly to the
[department] Secretary concerned, without intervening authority.” 42 This
highly unique structure will take the entire office of the special trial
counsel out of the military department-specific judge advocate chain of
command, ensuring that all of the special trial counsels are completely
independent from chains of command of any accused service member or
victim. Through an examination of the new legal landscape of the military
justice system, one can better understand the underlying reason for this
unprecedented transformation.
B. Loss of Faith in the System
Many believe that the problem Congress is trying to solve with this shift
in power is sexual assault underenforcement.43 This Article posits that there
is a much bigger, yet related, problem looming under the surface. There is a
crisis of legitimacy in the military justice system.44
Congress has been signaling for years that military justice decision
makers are failing to account for the long-term impact of their decisions on
accused service members, society, and victims.45 This failure, not sexual
38

NDAA 2022 § 531.
Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. § 532. The departments of the military are the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 10 U.S.C.
§ 101(a)(8).
42 NDAA 2022 § 532.
43 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 14, at 502–05.
44 For further discussion about the importance of legitimacy in a criminal justice system, see Note,
Prosecutorial Power and the Legitimacy of the Military Justice System, 123 HARV. L. REV. 937, 941
(2010) (arguing that “[l]egitimacy is an essential feature of an effective system of criminal justice”). See
generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 3–4
(1988) (calling this the subjective standard of procedural justice, which is the degree to which people
perceive the procedures to be fair).
45 See Brooker, supra note 9, at 101–06 (predicting this one-variable approach of focusing on
maintaining good order and discipline, specifically in the context of the treatment of wounded warriors,
39
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assault underenforcement, is the underlying reason why Congress has lost
faith in the system.
Over the last decade, Congress began to rein in commanders’ unfettered
discretion and issued warnings to military leaders that they needed to start
accounting for the long-term impact of their decisions. One example
occurred when Congress signaled to the military that it needed to start
accounting for the collateral consequences of a less-than-Honorable
discharge after the accused service member leaves the military. As part of
the 2017 NDAA, Congress included the bipartisan Fairness for Veterans
Amendment, mandating that Department of Defense (DoD) correction
boards, when reviewing military commanders’ discharge decisions, consider
the discharged service member’s mental health and the impact it may have
had on their behavior.46 The legislation also implicitly acknowledged the
lifelong impact of a less-than-Honorable discharge.47
Another example also occurred in 2016 when Congress directed the
Secretary of Defense to issue nonbinding guidance regarding factors that
military justice decision makers should consider.48 The Secretary issued the
Non-Binding Disposition Guidance, which lists considerations for panels
adjudging a sentence at court-martial,49 as well as variables military justice
decision makers should consider when deciding whether to announce the
punishment of an accused service member.50 It was the proverbial foreshock
to the seismic shift in the military justice system found in the 2022 NDAA.
Instead of trusting commanders to understand the multitude of variables that
must be considered when exercising prosecutorial discretion, Congress, for

as the next issue that may grab Congress’s attention and lead to congressional intervention if the military
does not fundamentally change its approach).
46 NDAA 2017, supra note 13, § 535, 130 Stat. at 2123–24 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 1553(d)(3));
S. Amend. 4138 to S. 2943, 114th Cong. (2016); see also Press Release, Gary Peters, Senate, Sen. Peters’
Fairness for Veterans Amendment Signed into Law (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.peters.senate.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/sen-peters-fairness-for-veterans-amendment-signed-into-law.
47 NDAA 2017 § 535; see also Memorandum from A.M. Kurta, Acting Under Sec’y of Def. for
Pers. & Readiness, Off. of the Under Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts, Clarifying Guidance to
Military Discharge Review Boards and Boards for Correction of Military/Naval Records Considering
Requests by Veterans for Modification of their Discharge Due to Mental Health Conditions, Sexual
Assault, or Sexual Harassment (Aug. 25, 2017), available at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/
Documents/pubs/Clarifying-Guidance-to-Military-Discharge-Review-Boards.pdf; Memorandum from
Robert L. Wilkie, Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness, Off. of the Under Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys
of the Mil. Dep’ts, Guidance to Military Discharge Review Boards and Boards for Correction of
Military/Naval Records Regarding Equity, Injustice, or Clemency Determinations, (July 25, 2018),
available
at
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/mra/CORB/Documents/Signed%20Memorandum%20
(Wilkie)%20with%20attachments.pdf [hereinafter Wilkie Memo].
48 NDAA 2017 § 5204, 130 Stat. at 2906–07 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 833).
49 MCM, supra note 8, app. 2.1.
50 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE para. 3-22 (20 Nov. 2020)
[hereinafter AR 27-10] (instructing commanders to consider the nature of the offense; the accused’s
record and position; the deterrent effect; and the impacts on unit morale, the victim, and the accused’s
leadership effectiveness).
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the first time in history, dictated that the President and Secretary of Defense
were responsible for listing the factors commanders should consider.
Not only were those guidelines nonbinding, but they ignored Congress’s
overriding directive to consider factors other than good order and discipline.
The guidance’s unfettered focus on good order and discipline as the sole
factor to consider when making disposition decisions is its fundamental
flaw. This singular focus, which by its very nature reflects the current
approach that uniformed officers take to military justice matters, is contrary
to statutory law. Article 33 of the UCMJ requires the Secretary of Defense
to account for “the principles contained in official guidance of the Attorney
General to attorneys for the Government with respect to disposition of
Federal criminal cases in accordance with the principle of fair and
evenhanded administration of Federal criminal law.”51 The Non-Binding
Disposition Guidance explicitly fails to satisfy this requirement. For
example, though civilian courts treat offender rehabilitation as a major
concern,52 the Non-Binding Disposition Guidance largely ignores the
principle of rehabilitation of the offender in a “broader context,” as is
required in federal civilian courts,53 mentioning it only as the last in a series
of variables in two very limited situations.54 Further, the term
“rehabilitation” is textually linked with continued military service, reading
“rehabilitation and continued service,”55 thereby potentially leading to an
understandable interpretation that the concept of rehabilitation is limited in
scope to potential for continued military service.
When making any decision, military leaders must account for multiple
variables that weigh on the situation. Laws and regulations set the “left and
right limits” of what is a permissible decision, but the discretion of how each
variable should be weighted is wholly vested in the leader with the requisite
authority. The military justice system is no different.56
The military justice system is almost always clear on who has the
requisite authority to make decisions. For example, Articles 22, 23, and 24
of the UCMJ specifically set forth who has the authority to convene various
levels of court-martial.57 Article 15 of the UCMJ states who has the authority
to exercise nonjudicial punishment.58 Service-specific regulations state who
has the authority to effectuate adverse administrative actions.59

51

10 U.S.C. § 833.
See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.110 (2020) (listing “rehabilitation of offenders” as
one of the general purposes of criminal law).
53 Id.
54 MCM, supra note 8, app. 2.1.
55 Id. app. 2.1, ¶¶ 2.5(f), 3.2(m).
56 See generally id.; AR 27-10, supra note 50; AR 635-200, supra note 5; AR 600-8-24, supra note 5.
57 10 U.S.C. §§ 822–24.
58 10 U.S.C. § 815; MCM, supra note 8, pt. II, ch. V.
59 See, e.g., AR 635-200, supra note 5, para. 1-19.
52
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Foundational documents within the military justice system set forth
variables that decision makers must consider. In explaining the purpose of
the military justice system, the Preamble to the Manual for Courts-Martial
states, “The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in
maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote
efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to
strengthen the national security of the United States.”60
The stated purpose of the military justice system inherently, yet
implicitly, rejects the single-variable analysis endemic within the current
military justice system. Unfortunately, military justice decision makers often
view all three listed variables as one and the same.61
What many military justice decision makers overlook is that the
“promote justice” variable is incredibly broad. It includes anything not
specifically included in the other two variables of maintaining good order
and discipline and promoting efficiency and effectiveness in the military
establishment. The long-term consequences of a decision within the military
justice system fall within this variable.
While the list of variables in the Non-Binding Disposition Guidance are
often helpful and could lead to better decisions in many cases, the 2022
NDAA’s removal of some elements of prosecutorial discretion from military
commanders proves that such lists are incomplete and inadequate. The 2022
NDAA’s further divestiture of prosecutorial discretion from commanders
indicates that the Non-Binding Disposition Guidance did nothing to restore
trust in that discretion, and if anything, further eroded it.
As a result, the Non-Binding Disposition Guidance, as it reflects the
approach to military justice that uniformed officers currently employ, is
incomplete. As such, continuing with this approach may lead Congress to
permanently divest prosecutorial discretion from uniformed officers or even
the DoD entirely, unless those exercising discretion take a broader approach
when making decisions.
Nonetheless, a broader approach should not eschew the importance of
good order and discipline. In fact, the impact of an action on good order and
discipline can, and in most cases should, remain the preeminent factor when
making decisions in the military justice system. The focus on the impact of
a decision on a unit is logical and understandable. The need for discipline
within the military is indisputable, as military units and members must
accomplish missions that are inherently dangerous and contrary to

60

MCM, supra note 8, pt. 1, ¶ 3.
See, e.g., Hill, supra note 14, at 476 (equating lawyers’ obligation to “promote justice” with
commanders’ duty to “maintain[] good order and discipline”); MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 1002(f)
(noting that the sentences of courts-martial should aim to “promote justice and to maintain good order
and discipline in the armed forces,” but not mentioning the promotion of efficiency and effectiveness in
the military establishment).
61
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self-preservation. A military justice system that does not consider the impact
that an action might have on a unit would not add value.
A focus on the impact of a decision on the good order and discipline of
a unit is also legal and proper. The Supreme Court has recognized and
validated this distinct factor in multiple ways: as a foundation for
jurisdiction,62 as a basis for criminality,63 and as a consideration in
decision-making.64 As a result, any new approach to exercising discretion in
military cases must account for the critical importance of this variable while
also improving the method of analysis to address the other numerous
disparate variables that matter to Congress.
“Maintaining good order and discipline” is the goal, not an explanation.
Military leaders who wish to preserve a separate military justice system need
to develop, nourish, and spread an ethic of providing more detailed
justifications for their decisions. They need to move away from a myopic
focus on one variable. This narrow focus on one variable in their
decision-making is contributing to Congress’s loss of faith in the system.
Moving forward, military justice decision makers need to decide how to
operate in this new regime. Notably, commanders still retain prosecutorial
discretion for most military justice decisions despite the shifts set forth in
2022 NDAA.65 The “covered offenses” that now fall under the judge
advocates’ discretion are only a few—albeit the most serious—offenses
within the dozens of punitive articles of the UCMJ.66 Despite this, the 2022
NDAA represents a fundamental shift in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion because this is the first time that decision-making authority is not
completely aligned with command authority.
Many senior military officers do not view the military justice system as
broken.67 Some military commanders, senior legal advisors, and scholars
believe that disciplinary authority is indispensable to command authority.68
They argue that the divesting of disciplinary authority from command
authority would undermine the stated purpose of military law.69
62

Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447–51 (1987).
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752–57 (1974).
64 See id. at 744 (“[T]he Court has approved the enforcement of those military customs and usages
by courts-martial from the early days of this Nation.”).
65 NDAA 2022, supra note 2, § 824a, 135 Stat. at 1695–96 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 824).
66 Id. § 533, 135 Stat. at 1695–96 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801); see also supra notes 35–36
and accompanying text.
67 See, e.g., Brooker, supra note 9, at 2.
68 See SCHLUETER & SCHENCK, supra note 14, at 3 (arguing that “[t]ransferring prosecutorial
discretion from commanders to judge advocates will undermine commanders’ authority to maintain good
order and discipline”); Melinda Wenner Moyer, “A Poison in the System”: The Epidemic of Military
Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/03/magazine/military-sexualassault.html (Oct. 11, 2021); Megan L. Greer, Who Is Preferred to Refer? The Proposed Transfer of
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Military 6 (Dec. 12, 2020) (unpublished comment),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3783502.
69 See SCHLUETER & SCHENCK, supra note 14, at 6. It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze
the merits of this argument.
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While the arguments to align prosecutorial discretion with command
authority are logical and understandable, that proverbial ship has sailed.
Congress has spoken. Congress now sees the problem to be the judgment of
those exercising discretion, more so than the laws and regulations that they
are using to make decisions. If Congress trusted the decisions that
commanders were making, the 2022 NDAA changes that divest
prosecutorial discretion from commanders would have been wholly
unnecessary. Military leaders should not fight the last war. The fight to keep
all authority vested in commanders is over.
Instead, military leaders must look forward and fight the next war. Those
interested in preventing further divestiture of prosecutorial discretion from
uniformed officers must figure out how to address the underlying legitimacy
and perception issues that are of concern to Congress. Otherwise, the system
will be lost to civilians altogether, and, ironically, military leaders may be
permanently constrained in their ability to preserve good order and
discipline. Employing the proposed test will enable military leaders to fight
that next war.
II. THE SOLUTION
This section will first explain the proposed solution, a concept borrowed
from the LOAC, to this conundrum. Next, this section will explore why it
makes sense to borrow from an area of law with which military leaders are
already familiar. It will also explore how the solution helps bring military
justice closer to the civilian system in ways Congress desires. Finally, this
section will describe the application of the proposed solution and analyze
variables military justice decision makers are underweighting.
A. Modified Proportionality Test
The proposed test, called the modified proportionality test, is borrowed
from the jus in bello proportionality test found in the LOAC.70 It involves a
balancing test that permits military justice decision makers to weigh the
anticipated collateral consequences to accused service members and society
against the anticipated maintenance of good order and discipline.
The jus in bello proportionality test is conceptually simple and easy to
understand. As stated in the DoD Law of War Manual, “Combatants must
refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected
to be gained.”71
When applying kinetic military force, commanders employ this
balancing test of two inherently incongruous variables—the concrete, direct
70
71

See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 5.12.
Id.
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military advantage to be gained and collateral damage. Similarly, military
justice decision makers must weigh two incompatible variables—the impact
to good order and discipline and the collateral consequences to accused
service members and society.
To properly account for all relevant variables, including long-term
collateral consequences, military justice decision makers should employ this
modified proportionality test. The test replaces the LOAC-based variables
with similar variables from the military justice system. Instead of the LOAC
collateral concerns of the “loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and
damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack,”72 the military
justice–based modification’s collateral concerns should include, but not be
limited to, long-term impact on accused service members and society.
Such a simple modification would force decision makers to consider
more than just the impact the decision has on good order and discipline, yet
not overvalue the collateral concerns. The sole focus on preservation of
good order and discipline is a problem because it does not account for the
federal principles of prosecution and sentencing. For example, a singular
focus on discipline in the unit may result in rehabilitating or punishing the
accused service member only to the extent that it helps them to remain a
soldier. For more serious felony cases, where an accused service member
may receive a benefits-disqualifying discharge, this sole focus does not
account for how to rehabilitate and punish the service member as they
transition to becoming a civilian.
The test would account for these principles while also remaining
open-ended in nature to encourage decision makers to not fixate on
checklists, but rather view the decisions holistically.
B. Borrowing from a Book on the Shelf
Borrowing from the LOAC—a book already on the military justice
decision maker’s shelf—makes sense because it contains purpose-based,
policy-level, and logical parallels with military justice. This subsection will
explore those parallels while also highlighting the proposed solution’s
incorporation of civilian federal criminal law principles.
When designing recent improvements intended to bolster the
effectiveness of and confidence in the military justice system, Congress has
looked almost exclusively to the civilian federal criminal system as a
model.73 The 2006 NDAA enacted a completely new Article 120 of the
UCMJ, which was largely “modeled after the [civilian system’s] sexual
assault offenses.”74 Congress designed additional changes in the 2014
72

Id.
This Article will hereinafter refer to the civilian federal criminal system as the “civilian system.”
74 Lisa M. Schenck, Sex Offenses Under Military Law: Will the Recent Changes in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice Re-Traumatize Sexual Assault Survivors in the Courtroom?, 11 OHIO STATE J.
CRIM. L. 439, 445 (2014).
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NDAA to make the military justice system better mimic the civilian system
throughout the pretrial and posttrial processes.75 Even the most recent
changes in the 2022 NDAA were made largely with the motivation of
“bringing military justice in line with civilian standards.”76
While the civilian system is an important guidepost to use when making
changes to the military justice system, it cannot be the only one. The
purpose of the military justice system is simultaneously broader and more
specific: instead of maintaining order in society at large by preventing
violence and destruction, the military justice system is designed to enable
violence and destruction by maintaining order in the distinct society of
those who practice the profession of arms. This uniquely different purpose
makes the civilian system only one of many sources those designing
improvements should consult.
Military justice decision makers are squarely at the intersection of two
professions: law and arms. The fact that such an intersection exists should
encourage those simultaneously practicing both professions to look within
both for efficiencies and improvements. Further, given that the LOAC
regulates the practice of discretion within the profession of arms, it is both a
logical and practical resource to consider when seeking to improve the
practice of military justice.77
Logically, the LOAC—and specifically the four basic principles of
necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity—have incredible
weight because of their near-universal acceptance.78 While the interpretation
and implementation of each principle is not uniform, the general nature of
the combined principles is. Further, the LOAC parallels the military justice
system in that both exist to protect the innocent. Whereas the LOAC is
designed to protect innocent civilians, the military justice system is designed
to protect people who are victims of crimes as well as those who are innocent
of crimes. Conversely, the destructive elements of the systems also warrant
their comparison. War denies people life and liberty. The military justice
75 See David Vergun, New Law Brings Changes to Uniform Code of Military Justice, U.S. ARMY
(Feb. 21, 2014), https://www.army.mil/article/120622/new_law_brings_changes_to_uniform_code_
of_military_justice (explaining that Congress repealed the requirement that alleged sexual assault victims
“show up at Article 32 hearings and frequently [are] asked to testify” in part because “civilian victims of
sexual assault didn’t have to show up or testify”).
76 Rachel VanLandingham, FY22 NDAA: A Missed Opportunity to Improve Military Justice, JUST
SEC. (Dec. 8, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/79481/ndaa-a-missed-opportunity/.
77 Even though a violation of the LOAC is punishable under the military justice system, and
therefore in some contexts serves as merely an element of the military justice system, the practice of the
LOAC is fundamentally a practicing of the profession of arms, whereas the practice of military law is
fundamentally a practicing of the profession of law. This Article explores a comparison of how these
legal codes are practiced, as Congress’s criticism of the military justice system has shifted from the
substantive laws to how those laws are practiced. See supra text accompanying notes 32–33.
78 See Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols, and Their Commentaries, INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp (last
visited Sept. 27, 2022) (providing a database of state parties by each convention).
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system, albeit for markedly different reasons, does the same. Finally, and
possibly most importantly, the systems are inextricably intertwined because
both share the common purpose of strengthening national security. Those
practicing the profession of arms “kill for reasons of state,”79 whereas the
stated purpose of the military justice system is to “strengthen the national
security of the United States.”80 Adherence to the LOAC is indisputably
linked to mission accomplishment—history is replete with examples of how
violating either the LOAC or a state’s military code compromised the
mission or how adhering to them enabled victory.81
Analyzing the LOAC for ways in which it could assist military justice
also makes practical sense. Whereas only judge advocates are trained on the
intricacies of the UCMJ, the LOAC is a fundamental tenet of the United
States military taught to and internalized by all service members.82 If a test
or method used within the LOAC is translatable to the military justice
system, non-attorney commanders would have an easier time understanding
it, compared with being expected to apply multiple and seemingly esoteric
legal tests and frameworks.
Nonetheless, many scholars and commentators are now concerned with
how the military justice system has unnecessarily harmed those who have
come into its path, whether they be those accused of crimes or victims of
crime.83 Given that Congress is now closely watching military justice
decision makers, those exercising discretion within the system would be
well-advised to look for ways in which they can minimize such damage. Just
like potentially disproportionate strikes leading to civilian death hindered
mission accomplishment in Afghanistan,84 many have posited that arguably
disproportionate strikes by the military justice system leading to the
unwarranted ruining of lives have the potential to do the same damage to the
military justice system.85 Military justice decision makers already
understand the concept of collateral damage when practicing the profession
of arms. By applying the proportionality test, they are demonstrating that
79 LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT:
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF WAR 8 (2d ed. 2022).
80 MCM, supra note 8, pt. 1, ¶ 3.
81 B LANK & NOONE, supra note 79, at 8–9 (summarizing the link between good order and discipline
and mission accomplishment).
82 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 2311.01, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM para. 1.2 (2 July 2020).
83 See Brooker, supra note 9, at 101–08 (exploring various early indicators that the public feels that
military justice decision makers applying the UCMJ do not properly value the impact that
service-connected disability has on misconduct).
84 Even if a strike was not a LOAC violation because the expected incidental harm was reasonably
judged to not be excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage, the
negative impact of civilian casualties on the mission was indisputable. In 2010, U.S. leadership
acknowledged that a “number of recent high-profile incidents in which civilians have been killed have
given the Taliban a propaganda tool against the coalition.” Barbara Starr, Military Proposes Medal for
Troops Showing Restraint, CNN (May 12, 2010, 5:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/12/
military.restraint.medal/index.html.
85 See supra note 83.
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they understand how to minimize incidental damage and evaluate it while
still accomplishing the mission.
When it comes to targeting, willful ignorance of the impact of an attack
or improper knowledge about the power of a weapon system is not a defense
to a commander accused of a LOAC violation.86 Those exercising kinetic
power within the profession of arms must account for multiple variables
when making decisions that could take life and liberty.
1. Purpose-Based Parallels
Military leaders are uniquely experienced in comparing disparate
variables in patently messy and unfair analyses. When applying the jus in
bello principle of proportionality, military members routinely weigh
numerous factors when deciding whether it is proper and advisable to take
life and liberty.87 As stated in the DoD Law of War Manual: “The principle
of proportionality typically involves the comparison of ‘unlike quantities
and values.’”88 Given that the military justice system also can deprive one
of life and liberty pursuant to a comparison of “unlike quantities and values”
such as good order and discipline, victim impact, and long-term
rehabilitation, the jus in bello proportionality test serves as a useful
framework upon which to craft a similar test for the military justice system.
The jus in bello proportionality test and decision-making within the
military justice system also have the same mandate of preventing
unnecessary suffering via excessive harm.89 While the taking of life and
liberty is contemplated and justified under both the LOAC and the military
justice system, there are limits.90
The two are also inherently linked because the purpose of both is to
“strengthen the national security of the United States.” 91 In fact, the military
justice system can be logically viewed as an enabling tool for those
applying the LOAC. This viewpoint is part of the reason why many in the

86 See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 5.10.5 (2016) (describing the relationship
between the “requirement to take feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks and the
prohibition on attacks expected to cause excessive incidental harm”); id. para. 5.11.6 (describing the
effectiveness of “selecting munitions of appropriate size and type” to reduce incidental harm); id. para.
18.9.3.1 (including among “grave breaches” of the Geneva Convention, regardless of willfulness, the
“extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly.”)
87 Id. para. 5.11 (describing feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks, including the
risk to civilians, timing, and new information).
88 Id. para. 5.10.2.3.
89 Id. para. 1.3.4. See MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 306(b) (requiring cases to be handled at the
lowest appropriate level).
90 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, paras. 2.3–2.4; MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M 306(b),
1002–04.
91 MCM, supra note 8, pt. 1, ¶ 3.
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DoD have been so resistant to the changes set forth in the 2022 NDAA. 92
Regardless of one’s viewpoint on the nesting of the military justice system
within the profession of arms, the shared purpose makes exploring the
LOAC for tests to improve the decision-making ability within the military
justice system logical.
2. Policy-Level Parallels
There are also policy-level parallels between the application of the jus
in bello proportionality test within the profession of arms and the application
of discretion within the military justice system. These parallels include the
mandatory nature of the application of the rules, punishment for failure to
violate those rules, and the identity of decision makers.
Drawing on the purpose-based parallels above, because excessive harm
is strictly forbidden under both the LOAC and military justice system, one
is not permitted to stray from the dictates of the jus in bello proportionality
test when applying force pursuant to the LOAC, nor is one making
decisions within the military justice system permitted from deviating from
its guidelines.
To illustrate, when applying the LOAC, one cannot refuse to apply the
proportionality test, regardless of how great the anticipated concrete and
direct military advantage to be gained might be.93 As the DoD Law of War
Manual states: “Military necessity does not justify actions that are prohibited
by the law of war.”94 Failure to properly apply the LOAC is punishable under
the UCMJ and potentially in other tribunals.95 Similarly, intentional failure
to apply the laws and procedures of the military justice system is not only a
criminal offense pursuant to Article 131f of the UCMJ,96 but it is also
fundamentally contrary to all tenets of the American common law system
and the Constitution.
The United States military has also promulgated control measures to
restrict, when necessary, who makes decisions when applying either the
LOAC or the military justice system. For example, the DoD Law of War
Manual explains, “commanders have implemented the requirements of the
principle of proportionality through military procedures, such as rules of
engagement, doctrine, standard operating procedures, and special
instructions.”97 These measures are in place to limit unnecessary and
improper destructive effects. The military justice system employs logically
similar control measures for the same reasons. The Rules for Courts-Martial,
See, e.g., Joint Chiefs Warn Against Overhauling Military Justice System, NAT’L GUARD ASS’N
U.S. (June 22, 2021), https://www.ngaus.org/about-ngaus/newsroom/joint-chiefs-warn-againstoverhauling-military-justice-system.
93 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 2.2.2.1 (2016).
94 Id. (emphasis in original).
95 10 U.S.C. § 818(a); LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, ch. XVIII.
96 10 U.S.C. § 931f.
97 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 5.10.3.
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military administrative regulations, and policy directives all work together,
attempting to achieve an optimal result.98
To illustrate the parallel, whereas jus in bello proportionality-based
policies can withhold kinetic strike decision authority to a certain level of
commander, the military justice system can do the same in terms of
withholding decision authority. Just as withholding kinetic strike authority
to higher levels is often advisable because “it is likely that more senior
commanders have a more comprehensive understanding of the strategic and
operational context,”99 withholding authority for certain military justice
actions to a higher level is often advisable because superior commanders
with additional experience, training, and broader viewpoint on what impact
the action may have are likely to exercise better judgment.100 Such is one of
the main reasons why all potential Article 120 offenses are, as a matter of
policy, withheld to a commander in the pay grade of O-6 or higher.101
3. Logical Parallels
The jus in bello proportionality test and decision-making within the
military justice system are also logically similar. There are three specific
likenesses that militate towards using the jus in bello proportionality test as
a framework for decision-making within the military justice system.
First, both the jus in bello proportionality test and decision-making
within the military justice system are based on the judgment that one variable
is paramount. Whereas the “concrete and direct military advantage expected
to be gained” is the primary variable in the jus in bello proportionality test,102
the impact of an action on good order and discipline is the most important
consideration in the military justice system. In a strict application of the jus
in bello proportionality test, the “concrete and direct military advantage
expected to be gained” is the independent variable—the acceptable amount
of tolerable collateral damage increases based on the determination of the
importance of the military advantage to be gained.103 Relatedly, “maintaining
good order and discipline” is the independent variable in the military justice
system—the number of tolerable collateral consequences of a decision made
98 MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 102; see, e.g., AR 27-10, supra note 50; Memorandum from Leon
E. Panetta, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Off. of the Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts et al., Withholding
Initial Disposition Authority Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice in Certain Sexual Assault Cases
(Apr. 20, 2012), available at https://dacipad.whs.mil/images/Public/10-Reading_Room/00_WhatNew/
SecDef_Memo_Withholding_Initial_Disposition_Authority_20120420.pdf [hereinafter Withholding
Initial Disposition Authority].
99 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 5.10.3.
100 MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 401 (“A superior competent authority may withhold the authority
of a subordinate to charges in individual cases, types of cases, or generally.”).
101 See Withholding Initial Disposition Authority, supra note 98. For discussion of Article 120’s
creation, see supra note 74 and accompanying text.
102 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 5.12.
103 Id. para. 5.12.3. While collateral damage can be minimized through various techniques, this
analysis looks at the nature of the test by considering one anticipated action.
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in the military justice system generally increases when a decision maker
within the military justice system believes that the alleged offense has had a
greater impact on good order and discipline.104
Second, both decision-making models allow the primary variable to be
analyzed independently of other considerations prior to application of the
remainder of the test or system. For example, when one is applying the jus
in bello proportionality test, the impact of the contemplated action in
furtherance of the “concrete and direct military advantage expected to be
gained” can typically be judged without any input from the other variables
that must be considered.105 Similarly, with the military justice system, the
impact of the action on the maintenance of good order and discipline, at least
in the short term, can be determined without any reference to collateral
consequences that are permitted to be considered.106
Third, and relatedly, both decision-making models either permit or
require the consideration of other variables that are completely or partially
independent from the primary variable. The jus in bello proportionality
test requires the consideration of collateral concerns.107 Similarly, the
military justice system permits the consideration of variables to “promote
justice,” which include not only the variables in the Non-Binding
Disposition Guidance108 but also the collateral consequences that could
impact rehabilitation. 109
C. Application of the Test
To better understand the proposed solution to the congressional
military justice legitimacy crisis, this subsection will describe the
application of the test while highlighting variables military justice decision
makers are underweighting.
Military justice decision makers should use the following weighted
balancing test: “Commanders and judge advocates must refrain from a
decision in which the collateral consequences to accused service members
and society would be excessive in relation to the anticipated impact the
decision would have on the maintenance of good order and discipline.”110
The test cannot cure a fundamentally improper judgment about an
action’s anticipated impact on maintaining good order and discipline. For
example, if a decision maker chooses to not prosecute a provable felony-level
offense for improper reasons, this test cannot ameliorate such a judgment.
104

MCM, supra note 8, app. 2.1, ¶ 2.1.
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 5.12.2.
106 MCM, supra note 8, at pt. 1, ¶ 3.
107 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 2.4.
108 MCM, supra note 8, app. 2.1, ¶ 2.1.
109 Id. R.C.M. 1001(b)(5)(C)–(D); U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-9, MILITARY JUDGES’
BENCHBOOK paras. 2-5-21 to -22 (2020) [hereinafter MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK].
110 This test adapts language from the LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 5.10.
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Understanding how the two incongruous variables are weighted in the
LOAC setting is vital to understanding how the balancing test will occur in
the military justice context.
1. Maintaining Good Order and Discipline: ‘Direct and Concrete
Military Advantage’ of the Military Justice System
The military advantage variable in the jus in bello proportionality test is
easily modifiable for application in a reformulated military justice-focused
test. In LOAC proportionality analyses, the decision maker must understand
the “concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained” by the
action.111 When applying the test within the military justice system,
“maintaining good order and discipline,” and its corollary of “promot[ing]
efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment,”112 logically and
easily amount to the “concrete and direct military advantage expected to be
gained” variable in the jus in bello proportionality test. The term “military
advantage” inherently encompasses the “good order and discipline” and
“efficiency and effectiveness” of the unit, as all are designed to improve the
unit’s ability or preparedness to destroy an enemy, and “thereby . . .
strengthen the national security of the United States.”113
Under the LOAC, decision makers must use “common sense and good
faith” when applying the proportionality test.114 Similarly, decision makers
in the military justice system must use their individual discretion depending
on the decision to be made.115 Both systems implicitly require that decisions
be made in good faith.
Common sense and good faith, however, are intangible. The reasons
underlying decisions pursuant to both the LOAC and the military justice
system must be articulable. For example, the qualifiers that the expected
military advantage to be gained must be “concrete and direct” impliedly
mandates that the expected advantage can be explained. The DoD Law of
War Manual states, “the military advantage may not be merely hypothetical
or speculative, although there is no requirement that the military advantage
be ‘immediate.’”116 Beyond being articulable, the person applying force
must be intellectually honest. The DoD Law of War Manual states that those
applying force must have “a good[-]faith expectation that the attack will
make a relevant and proportional contribution to the goal of the military
attack involved.”117
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Id.
MCM, supra note 8, pt. 1, ¶ 3.
113 Id.
114 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 5.10.2.3.
115 MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 401; MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 109, paras.
2-5-21 to -22.
116 LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 21, para. 5.12.2.
117 Id.
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Military justice decision makers would improve their decision-making
by following this guidance. When basing a decision largely on the impact it
would have on good order and discipline, leaders should explain their
decision beyond “gut feeling” logic. The term “maintaining good order and
discipline” is the goal, not an explanation. Decisions would be more accurate
and justifiable if the decision maker explained specifically how the decision
would serve the end of “maintaining good order and discipline.”
Military justice decision makers often revert to the principle of general
deterrence on the unit when explaining how a decision will impact good
order and discipline.118 The problem, however, is military justice
practitioners are rarely, if ever, trained on the concept of general deterrence,
to include the relationship between the severity of a decision and the impact
of the decision on deterring misconduct more broadly.119 Military justice
decision makers commonly vastly overestimate the deterrent effect their
decisions have on future misconduct within a unit.120
Decision makers who choose to articulate specifically how a decision will
impact the unit will be more likely to research and better understand concepts
like general deterrence prior to deciding. This research will likely lead to better
reasoned decisions, which will likely be more accurate and defensible.
Articulating their decision-making, moreover, is more likely to account
for the impact of the crime on the victim and society. This impact is
inextricably intertwined with maintenance of good order and discipline,
which is not served in a case that is under-prosecuted.121 The test proposed
in this Article does not account for military justice decision makers
misjudging the impact of good order and discipline. It does, however,
require decision makers to articulate their logic with respect to this variable,
thereby improving the chances that initial misjudgments will be apparent
and corrected prior to final disposition. In other words, the interests of
prosecuting serious misconduct are invariably dovetailed with maintaining
good order and discipline.
The military justice system’s general failure to require justifications for
most decisions, such as in the sentencing context, is unique. For instance,

118 See e.g., SCHLUETER & SCHENCK, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that military justice rules “attempt
to balance the need for justice and discipline”); Brenner-Beck, supra note 14, at 116 (noting that panels
have “panel’s expertise in evaluating the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation”); MacDonnell et al.,
supra note 14 (noting that commanders are better suited than lawyers to consider a specific unit’s
available resources and need for deterrence); Hill, supra note 14, at 476 (noting that only “commanders
are duty-bound to exact their subordinates obedience to law and disciplinary standards”).
119 This assertion is based on the authors’ collective professional experiences serving in various
roles within the military justice system and as law school clinicians whose daily duties include reviewing
decisions made within the military justice system.
120 Id.
121 The authors cannot conceive of a situation where good order and discipline is more effectively
maintained with a failure to prosecute serious offenses with credible admissible evidence to sustain a
conviction.
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Article III federal judges must articulate the basis of a sentence. Failure to
do so may result in a sentence being overturned by an appellate court and
necessitate a new sentencing proceeding.123 Even state-level justice systems
tacitly or implicitly require explanations for decisions. Even if a formal
written explanation for a decision is not required, state-level prosecutors,
most of whom are elected,124 may face consequences for decisions that the
electorate perceives to be unreasoned.125 In the military justice system,
Congress has now expressed disapproval with the decisions being made.126
Now is the time for military justice decision makers to develop a
widespread ethic of providing more detailed justifications of their decisions.
Decision makers need to take concrete steps to ensure they are engaging in
meaningful analysis, especially amid the new landscape of the 2022 NDAA
and because decision makers have struggled to adopt such an ethic despite
years of pushing from Congress.
Military justice decision makers who internalize a duty to articulate the
rationale for decisions will also be moved to explain the collateral concerns
that they considered. The process of articulating and justifying a decision is,
in and of itself, a valuable exercise, as it may change the initial anticipated
decision by forcing the decision maker into a fruitful and vital internal
struggle with the relevant variables.127 This type of struggle is commonplace
when applying force pursuant to the LOAC.
With the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology (CDEM), both the
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have
created a widely accepted and employed tool to help those applying force
pursuant to the LOAC better understand the impact the decision will have

122 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109–10 (2007); United States v. Provance, 944
F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (“When rendering a sentence, the district court must make an individualized
assessment based on the facts presented and ‘must state in open court the particular reasons supporting
its chosen sentence.’”) (quoting United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)).
123 Provance, 944 F.3d at 218.
124 See Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, Picking Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1537,
1548 (2020) (“Although the Attorney General and United States Attorneys are appointed in the federal
system, the vast majority of states elect their attorney general and hold separate elections for local
prosecutors.”).
125 For example, Amy Weirich lost reelection to her position as district attorney in Shelby County,
Tennessee, after “stirr[ing] national outrage for bringing criminal charges against a Black woman
[Pamela Moses] for trying to register to vote.” Sam Levine, Memphis Prosecutor Who Charged Black
Woman over Voting Error Loses Re-election Bid, GUARDIAN, (Aug, 5, 2022, 9:15 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/aug/05/memphis-amy-weirich-loses-reelection-pamelamoses. But cf. Hessick & Morse, supra note 124, at 1544 (finding that incumbent prosecutors seeking
reelection “win an astonishing 95 percent of the time”).
126 See supra, text accompanying notes 8–13.
127 See, e.g., Enide Maegherman et al., Accountability in Legal Decision-Making, 29 PSYCHIATRY,
PSYCH. & L. 345, 346 (2022) (explaining the utility of justifying legal decisions).
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on collateral concerns. While the specifics of this methodology are too
broad for discussion here, the methodology generally incorporates scientific
studies, assumptions, law, and policy to provide actionable and
understandable data about the potential collateral concerns.129 Relatedly, the
methodology incorporates potential mitigation measures in its analysis. For
example, it can estimate anticipated casualties from a strike if certain
variables are changed, such as if the strike is conducted at night instead of
day, or if a different munition or delivery method is used.130
As it is with those applying force pursuant to the LOAC, the jus in bello
proportionality test is also a useful framework for the military justice system
because it permits the proper weighting of the variables to be considered. As
described above, under the jus in bello proportionality test, the “concrete and
direct military advantage expected to be gained” is the independent
variable.131 The anticipated collateral damage is not on equal footing, as it
must be “excessive” for the action to violate the proportionality principle.
Further, reasonable actors can assess that a significant amount of collateral
damage can occur prior to it reaching excessive levels, particularly if the
anticipated concrete and direct military advantage is large. By using the test
to consider decisions, military justice decision makers will improve their
decisions by finally striking the proper balance of considering the impact of
a decision on good order and discipline while simultaneously considering
other critical variables.
2. Collateral Consequences Variable: ‘Collateral Damage’
of the Military Justice System
When employing the modified proportionality test, military justice
decision makers must consider collateral consequences to accused service
members and society. Yet, just like in the LOAC setting, the consequences
may not be avoidable in some cases.
While all military justice actions have collateral consequences to the
accused, the list of collateral consequences for service members who receive
less-than-Honorable discharges is long and unique.132 Military justice
decision makers, however, tend to overlook or simply do not understand
these consequences—particularly the consequences resulting from a
128 CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 3160.01, NO-STRIKE AND THE COLLATERAL
DAMAGE ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY, at D-1 (13 Feb. 2009) [hereinafter CJCSI 3160.01] (subsequent
versions are not available publicly); JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-60, JOINT TARGETING, at II-18
(31 Jan. 2013); N. ATL. TREATY ORG., ALLIED JOINT PUB. 3-9, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR JOINT
TARGETING 1-27 (ed. B, ver. 1 2021).
129 For example, the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology can generate an estimated number
of civilian deaths or serious injuries resulting from a strike. See CJCSI 3160.01, supra note 128, at GL-4
(defining casualty estimate).
130 See id. at D-A-17 to -29, D-A-31.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 102–04.
132 See discussion infra Subsection II.C.2.
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benefits-disqualifying discharge. Thus, it is worthwhile to spend time
exploring the most common collateral consequences to provide a holistic
understanding of this variable in the modified proportionality test.
Having “veteran” status is critical to obtaining many post-service
benefits. As such, there are numerous U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) benefits for which a former service member with a
benefits-disqualifying discharge will not qualify.134 While military justice
decision makers need not be VA benefits–eligibility experts, they should
have a general understanding of the legal and practical impact
of benefits-disqualifying discharge characterizations on eligibility. Simply
put, discharge characterization directly impacts—and often inhibits—a
service member’s ability to obtain VA benefits.135 Congress defined a
“veteran” as “a person who served in the active military, naval, air, or space
service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions
other than dishonorable.”136 However, the use of “dishonorable” in the
133

See supra text accompanying note 118–21.
This section is not a comprehensive discussion of all potential VA benefits, but it includes the
most common ones to illustrate the importance of adopting this approach.
135 Every military member who separates from service after serving more than six months on active
duty receives a discharge characterization. See DoDI 1332.14, supra note 29, encl. 4, para. 3; glossary
n.1 (2022) (distinguishing between entry-level separation during the first 180 days of military service,
which is considered Uncharacterized separation, and separation with characterization of service). Service
members leave the military for a myriad of reasons, including expiration of their term of service,
retirement, medical disability, administrative separation, or court-martial. Id. at 9, 14, 22. Today, enlisted
service members, as well as commissioned officers, can receive an Honorable, General, or Other Than
Honorable discharge administratively. See id. at 30–31, 55. Enlisted members can also receive one of
two types of punitive discharges—Bad Conduct or Dishonorable discharge, both of which can only be
imposed at a court-martial. MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 1003(b)(8)(B)–(C). Specifically, a Bad Conduct
discharge can be imposed at either (1) a general court-martial or (2) a special court-martial empowered
to adjudge a Bad Conduct discharge, id. R.C.M. 1003(b)(8)(C). The latter is often referred to as “BCD
Special.” In contrast, commissioned officers are only subject to dismissal at a court-martial, which is the
functional equivalent of a Dishonorable discharge, or by order of the President during a time of war. See
id. R.C.M. 1003(b)(8)(A); 10 U.S.C. § 1161(a). The characterization of one’s military discharge, whether
Honorable, General, Other Than Honorable, Bad Conduct, Dishonorable, Dismissal, or Uncharacterized,
is captured on a DD Form 214 at the time of separation. DD Form 214, Discharge Papers and Separation
Documents, NAT’L ARCHIVES: NAT’L PERS. RECS. CENTER, https://www.archives.gov/personnelrecords-center/dd-214 (Apr. 26, 2018). This form serves as an enduring record of the service member’s
military service, functioning as a report card of their service for future employers and providing a basis
for accessing (or denying) veteran benefits. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 635-8, SEPARATION
PROCESSING AND DOCUMENTS paras. 1-11(p)(2)–(3) (17 Sept. 2019) (stating that “[t]he benefits a Soldier
may be eligible to receive as a result of military service will be based primarily on the DD Form 214”
and “[c]ivilian employment may be affected by the data on the DD Form 214”); Harmon v. Brucker, 355
U.S. 579, 583 (1958) (quoting contemporaneous Army regulations explaining the purpose of a discharge
certificate is “to record the separation of an individual from the military service and to specify the
character of service rendered during the period covered by the discharge”).
136 38 U.S.C.A. § 101(2) (West 2022) (emphasis added); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (2021),
amended by Inclusion of the Space Force as Part of the Armed Forces, 87 Fed. Reg. 26124, 26125 (May
3, 2022) (defining “veteran” as “a person who served in the active military, naval, air, or space service
and who was discharged or released under conditions other than dishonorable”). For an in-depth
134
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VA benefits–eligibility context has a different meaning and application than
in the military justice system.
“Dishonorable” in the military justice context is commonly used to
describe only the worst type of characterization of service one can earn when
discharged from the service.137 In the VA benefits–eligibility context,
Congress implemented statutory bars to veteran benefits to delineate
between “dishonorable” and “honorable” service.138 The VA further
expanded this distinction through implementing regulatory bars to
benefits.139 In light of these statutory and regulatory bars, recipients of Other
Than Honorable (OTH) and punitive discharges are generally unable to
obtain VA benefits, including health care.140 Military justice decision
makers should be aware of the VA benefits landscape when making
disposition decisions.
In addition to the legal implications of benefits-disqualifying discharges,
military justice decision makers should also be aware of the practical
impacts of less-than-Honorable discharges on VA benefits. Even federal
judges with highly specialized knowledge about VA disability law have
discussion of the statutory and legislative background of the term “veteran,” see Bradford Adams & Dana
Montalto, With Malice Toward None: Revisiting the Historical and Legal Basis for Excluding Veterans
from “Veteran” Services, 122 PENN STATE L. REV. 69, 105–12 (2017).
137 See MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 1003(b)(8)(B) (“A dishonorable discharge should be reserved
for those who should be separated under conditions of dishonor, after having been convicted of offenses
usually recognized in civilian jurisdictions as felonies, or of offenses of a military nature requiring severe
punishment[.]”).
138 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a).
139 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (2021).
140 When a former service member presents a DD Form 214 with an Other Than Honorable or Bad
Conduct discharge to the VA in an effort to obtain veteran benefits, the VA conducts a “character of
discharge” determination. The VA requires a “character of discharge” determination if a service member
received an undesirable discharge, an Other Than Honorable discharge, or a Bad Conduct discharge. See
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., M21-1, ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES MANUAL pt. X, subpart iv, ch. 1,
§ A.1.c. (2021). Practically, from the outset, the VA presumes that these types of discharges do not entitle
the separated service member to veteran status. See OUTVETS ET AL., TURNED AWAY: HOW VA
UNLAWFULLY DENIES HEALTH CARE TO VETERANS WITH BAD PAPER DISCHARGES 17–22 (2020)
(highlighting how some VA training materials erroneously state Other Than Honorable discharge status
as a disqualification for health care benefits). This process requires the VA to conduct “an individualized
eligibility determination to decide whether the veteran was discharged under ‘dishonorable conditions’
or ‘other than dishonorable conditions,’” id. at 2, in accordance with the congressional veteran definition.
John W. Brooker et al., Beyond “T.B.D.”: Understanding VA’s Evaluation of a Former Servicemember’s
Benefit Eligibility Following Involuntary or Punitive Discharge from the Armed Forces, 214 MIL. L.
REV. 1, 25–27 (2012). During a character of discharge determination, the VA will analyze both statutory
and regulatory bars depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. If neither the statutory nor
regulatory bars apply to a particular case, that period of service is deemed “honorable” for VA purposes.
Id. A period of service is generally fulfilled when service members serve the amount of time listed in
their enlistment contract. Notably, the VA does not view one’s completion of a period of service when
one reenlists. See id. at 70–98 (providing an in-depth analysis of how to calculate a prior period of
honorable service and whether that prior period serves as an independent basis for VA benefits). In
contrast, if one of the statutory or regulatory bars applies, that period of service will be deemed
“dishonorable” for VA purposes. Id. at 25–27. See id. at 110–200 for a more in-depth analysis of the
VA’s character of discharge determination process and decisions.
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called the benefits-eligibility rules “murky” because of confusing and
antiquated provisions;141 not surprisingly, separated service members,
commanders, and judge advocates are similarly puzzled.142 Employees at the
VA are likewise confused when navigating and deciding whether a service
member is eligible for VA benefits.143
As a result, the VA often makes erroneous benefit-eligibility decisions.
A Harvard study published in 2020 entitled Turned Away concluded that the
VA routinely wrongly denied potentially eligible veterans critical benefits,
a pattern it called “national, persistent, and systemic.”144 The VA’s wrongful
denial of lifesaving benefits has a widespread impact on this underserved
and vulnerable population.145
In most cases, the most impactful collateral consequence is the loss of
VA health care benefits. Losing eligibility for VA health care benefits,
including mental health treatment, can be devastating for both the former
service member and for society.146 Recipients of punitive discharges are
statutorily ineligible for health care at the VA for service-connected
disabilities.147 Recipients of OTH discharges may also be barred from
accessing VA health care for service-connected disabilities if a statutory bar
to benefits applies.148 Yet, if a service member with an OTH discharge is not
statutorily barred but falls within one of the regulatory bars to benefits
identified in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d), they will be legally entitled to VA health
care “limited to the treatment of any disability incurred or aggravated
during active service.”149 Nonetheless, these former service members are
unlikely to receive VA health care for their service-connected conditions, as
the VA will, almost inevitably, wrongly deny these former service members

141

Trilles v. West, 13 Vet. App. 314, 330 (2000) (Kramer, J., & Steinberg, J., concurring).
See Brooker et al., supra note 140, at 208–11 (describing errors and confusion regarding benefits
eligibility among military attorneys and judges). Veteran service organizations (VSOs) are available to
aid service members in their efforts to obtain benefits. Id. at 217, app. M.
143 See OUTVETS ET AL., supra note 140, at 13–22 (describing the frequency with which former
service members are wrongfully turned away when seeking care at VA medical facilities, as well as the
inadequate training provided to staff).
144 Id. at 15.
145 See generally id.
146 Id. at 1 (noting that former service members with less-than-Honorable discharges “have higher
rates of mental health conditions, suicide, homelessness, and unemployment”).
147 38 U.S.C. § 5303(e); see 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(2) (2021) (barring veterans who are discharged
“[b]y reason of the sentence of a general court-martial”); Act of Oct. 8, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-126, 91
Stat. 1106, 1107–08 (stipulating that VA health providers “shall not provide such health care . . . for any
disability incurred or aggravated during a period of service from which such person was discharged by
reason of a bad conduct discharge”); 38 C.F.R. § 3.360(b) (2021) (barring veterans with a Bad Conduct
discharge, regardless the level of court-martial, from receiving health care). This bar to health care
extends to that period of service only, and care could be predicated upon a prior period of honorable
service. See Brooker et al., supra note 140, at 72–83.
148 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a). See generally Brooker et al., supra note 140 (providing an in-depth analysis
of specific case facts regarding eligibility for VA benefits).
149 Brooker et al., supra note 140, at 50 (emphasis in original).
142
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from receiving the care they deserve. In contrast, an Honorable or General
discharge characterization will preserve health care for service-connected
disabilities so long as no statutory bars to benefits apply.151
Affording VA health care to service members afflicted with
combat-induced mental health conditions is often lifesaving because VA
health care is “[t]he only reservoir of combat PTSD [post-traumatic stress
disorder] expertise.”152 Moreover, there is often a connection between the
discharged service members’ misconduct that led to their discharge and their
military-caused mental health condition. Clinical psychiatrist Jonathan Shay
testified before Congress that the denial of VA mental health treatment to
recipients of benefits-disqualifying discharges is “as unjust and irrational as
if they had been drummed out for failure to stand at attention after their feet
had been blown off. Most of these men committed offenses because of their
combat PTSD.”153
Further exacerbating the denial of disability health care, former service
members may have conditions related to their military service that had not
yet been discovered or diagnosed at discharge. Thus, a military member’s
service-connected disabilities may not yet be known at the time discharge is
characterized. Almost every conflict has a set of medical conditions that are
presumptively connected to service in that theater of operations.154 These
specified conditions, categorized by the conflict in which the military
member fought, are presumed to be service-connected for purposes of
determining eligibility for VA disability–related benefits, including health
care. 155 For example, Type 2 diabetes, ischemic heart disease, Hodgkin’s
disease, and respiratory cancers are deemed automatically service-connected
for Vietnam veterans.156 This means that those who served in Vietnam will
almost invariably receive VA health care and benefits if ever diagnosed with

150

See OUTVETS ET AL., supra note 140, at 13.
See 38 U.S.C. § 5303 (detailing limitations to receiving veterans’ benefits based on discharge
status). Military justice decision makers must note that former service members with more than one prior
period of service may be eligible for VA benefits based on that prior service period if it was under
conditions other than dishonorable. See Brooker et al., supra note 140, at 70–98 (describing how a prior
period of service may serve as an independent basis for granting benefits at the VA).
152 Health Care, Economic Opportunities and Social Services for Veterans and Their Dependents—
A Community Perspective: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm.
on Veterans’ Affs., 103d Cong. 105 (1993) (statement of Warren Quinlan, Director of Operations, New
England Shelter for Homeless Veterans).
153 Viewpoints on Veterans Affairs and Related Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
& Investigations of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affs., 103d Cong. 117 (1994) (statement of Jonathan
Shay, M.D., Ph.D.) (emphasis in original).
154 VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY
BENEFITS 1 (2021), available at https://www.benefits.va.gov/BENEFITS/factsheets/serviceconnected/
presumption.pdf.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 2.
151
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one of these conditions, even if the diagnosis comes decades after separation
from military service.157
Unfortunately, most presumptive conditions are not discovered and
established until well after the war has ended and the service members who
fought in that war have been discharged.158 For example, presumptive
conditions related to the Vietnam War were added in 2021.159 While some
presumptive medical conditions linked to service in the Middle East
and Afghanistan have already been determined,160 it is almost guaranteed
that many more will be added to the list in the decades to come as the
etiologies behind medical conditions common to those who deployed are
better understood.
However, decision makers in the military justice system do not yet know
what these presumptive conditions will be when making their justice-related
decisions. They do know that it is inevitable that many veterans will develop
serious service-connected conditions decades following service. For
example, while the VA was researching the impact of burn pits,161 Congress
passed the Honoring our PACT Act, adding two dozen cancers and illnesses
to the list of conditions that the VA will presume were incurred during
military service for those who served in one of the designated Middle
Eastern locations on or after August 2, 1990.162 Future service-connected
conditions are “known unknowns.”163 Thus, it is critical for military justice
decision makers to understand that an OTH or punitive discharge could deny
a service member VA health care not only for known current conditions,

157 Agent Orange Exposure and VA Disability Compensation, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS.,
https://www.va.gov/disability/eligibility/hazardous-materials-exposure/agent-orange/ (Aug. 19, 2022).
158 FACT SHEET: Biden Administration Announces Actions to Address the Health Effects of
Military Exposures, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
statements-releases/2021/11/11/fact-sheet-biden-administration-announces-actions-to-address-the-healtheffects-of-military-exposures.
159 Agent Orange Exposure and VA Disability Compensation, supra note 157, (listing three new
presumptive conditions associated with Agent Orange exposure during the Vietnam War: bladder cancer,
hypothyroidism, and Parkinsonism); VA Adds Three New Agent Orange Presumptions, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFS., https://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/publications/agent-orange/agent-orange2021/presumptions.asp (Sept. 10, 2021) (“As a result of the FY21 National Defense Authorization Act,
VA added three new conditions that are related to exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides: bladder
cancer, hypothyroidism, and Parkinsonism (also known as Parkinson-like conditions).”).
160 VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 154, at 4–5.
161
Airborne Hazards and Burn Pit Exposures, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS.,
https://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/burnpits/ (Sept. 30, 2022). Respiratory diseases were
presumptively service-connected in 2021. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., VA to Start
Processing Disability Claims for Certain Conditions Related to Particulate Matter (Aug. 2, 2021),
https://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=5699.
162 Honoring our PACT Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-168, § 406, 136 Stat. 1759, 1783–85 (to be
codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1120).
163 See Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., NATO Press Conference (June 7, 2002) (transcript
available at https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm) (famously describing the concept of
“known unknowns”).
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but also for devastating conditions caused by wartime service that manifest
in the future.
Further, wartime service is not always required to suffer devastating
health consequences decades later directly because of military service.
Severely contaminated water at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,164 and
possibly at many other military installations,165 has sickened and killed a
horrifying number of military members and their families.166 Military justice
decision makers at the time did not know about the contaminated water.
They know now, however, that such unfortunate situations are all too
common, even though the specific nature of the situation may not be known
at the time of a decision made within the military justice system.
Congress cares about former service members who receive
benefits-disqualifying discharges and how it impacts their ability to access
health care at the VA. In 2017, the VA implemented a regulation that
provides emergency mental health services for up to ninety days including
inpatient, outpatient, or residential treatment regardless of discharge
characterization.167 In 2018, Congress passed 38 U.S.C. § 1720I, which
extended mental and behavioral health care to recipients of OTH discharges
who served at least 100 cumulative days on active duty and deployed “in a
theater of combat operations, in support of a contingency operation, or in an
area at a time during which hostilities are occurring,” as well as who
survived military sexual trauma.168 However, this extension of care does not
reach recipients of punitive discharges.169 This narrowly tailored legislation
is even less impactful as intended, as the VA routinely misinterprets its own
regulations and improperly denies care to those who are eligible.170
A commonly overlooked collateral consequence is the connection
between benefits-disqualifying discharges and homelessness.171 Those who
164 Camp Lejeune Water Contamination Health Issues, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS.,
https://www.va.gov/disability/eligibility/hazardous-materials-exposure/camp-lejeune-water-contamination
(Mar. 7, 2022).
165 Catherine Herridge & Andrew Bast, Service Members and Families Affected by Toxic Water at
Marine Base Still Seeking Justice Decades Later, CBS NEWS (Jan. 10, 2022, 10:24
AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/toxic-water-marine-base-service-members-families-justice
(explaining that “Environmental Working Group, an environmental research organization, reports 385
military sites ‘have contaminated drinking water or ground water’”).
166 Congress also addressed exposure to contaminated water at Camp Lejeune in the Honoring our
PACT Act, giving those with “veteran” status who spent at least 30 days on site from 1953 to 1987 a
federal cause of action to seek compensation. Honoring our PACT Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-168,
§ 804, 136 Stat. 1759, 1802–04.
167 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., EMERGENT MENTAL HEALTH CARE FOR FORMER SERVICE
MEMBERS 1 (June 2017), available at https://www.va.gov/HOMELESS/ssvf/docs/Fact_Sheet_
Emergent_Mental_Health_Care_for_Former_Service_Members.pdf.
168 38 U.S.C. § 1720I(b)(4).
169 Id.
170 See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
171 Jack Tsai & Robert A. Rosenheck, Risk Factors for Homelessness Among US Veterans, 37
EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 177, 188, 191 (2015).
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serve in the military often serve in locations far away from their homes of
record or residency.172 Termination of their military employment often
requires them to relocate after discharge.173 The VA offers housing resources
to qualifying veterans.174 Yet, recipients of benefits-disqualifying discharges
are generally ineligible for these resources and face increased risk of
homelessness.175 Tragically, those with “bad paper” discharges—those with
an Other Than Honorable discharge or worse176—are “estimated to be at
seven times the risk of homelessness as other veterans.”177 Moreover,
veterans with bad paper “‘find it harder, if not impossible to obtain rental
housing, credit, licenses, mortgages, home improvement loans, life and
medical insurance’ and [find their discharge status] generally transforms
them into ‘bad risks’ by any public or financial organization’s calculus.”178
This vicious cycle results in former service members with
benefits-disqualifying discharges enduring higher rates of homelessness,
making access to VA benefits even more critical.179
A correlation exists between benefits-disqualifying discharges, mental
health, and homelessness.180 As a result, many former service members with
less-than-Honorable or punitive discharge characterizations find themselves
caught in a vicious cycle. The misconduct that led to their less-than-Honorable
discharge was caused by or related to a military-induced mental health
issue.181 Thus, unsurprisingly, service members with benefits-disqualifying
discharges are more likely to suffer from a mental health condition.182 Yet,
those suffering from these mental health conditions are often ineligible for
health care and other lifesaving benefits at the VA.183 In fact, “[t]hree out of
172 See Emily Moy, State of Residence vs. Home of Record: What Does It All Mean?, U.S. ARMY
(Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.army.mil/article/160640/state_of_residence_vs_home_of_record_what_
does_it_all_mean.
173 See Deciding Where to Live When You Leave the Military, MIL. ONESOURCE (June 9, 2022, 9:17
AM), https://www.militaryonesource.mil/military-life-cycle/separation-transition/military-separationretirement/deciding-where-to-live-when-you-leave-the-military.
174 See, e.g., VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, LEGAL SERVS. CTR. OF HARVARD L. SCH., UNDERSERVED:
HOW THE VA WRONGFULLY EXCLUDES VETERANS WITH BAD PAPER 22 (2016) (explaining that a major
program that provides housing support is the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development-VA
Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) program. This HUD and VA program “combines the value of a
Section 8 housing voucher with the wrap-around support of VA social work and health-care services.”).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 27.
177 VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, supra note 174, at 22. In 2014, two out of three homeless former
military members in Houston had benefits-disqualifying discharges. Id.
178 Brooker et al., supra note 140, at 12 n.13.
179 OUTVETS ET AL., supra note 140, at 1; see also Cynthia M.A. Geppert, Bad Paper,
Good Decisions: Providing Mental Health Care to All Veterans Regardless of Discharge Status, 34
FED. PRAC. 4, 5 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6370434/pdf/fp-34-05-04.pdf
(“Nonroutinely discharged veterans are more likely to be homeless.”).
180 VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, supra note 174, at 21–22.
181 OUTVETS ET AL., supra note 140, at 1–2.
182 Id. at 2.
183 Id.
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four veterans with bad paper discharges who served in combat and who have
[p]ost-traumatic stress disorder are denied eligibility by the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals.”184 As a result, mental health conditions caused by their
military service often go untreated.185
Loss of future employability is an additional overlooked collateral
consequence. Not only has the separated service member lost their military
career, but their benefits-disqualifying discharge will also likely impact their
future employment.186 Benefits-disqualifying discharges, particularly those
characterized as OTH or worse, have a negative stigma that “greatly limits
the opportunities for both public and private civilian employment.”187
Employers frequently request a former service member applicant’s
discharge paperwork (DD Form 214) as part of the job application process
and likely draw inaccurate conclusions or make assumptions,188 as the case
examples in Part III illustrate. Stigma among employers naturally persists in
light of over eighty-five percent of discharges being Honorable.189 As a
result, separated military members with less-than-Honorable discharges
have higher rates of unemployment.190
The collateral consequences further extend to the loss of access to
education benefits. Recipients of less-than-Honorable discharges lose the
robust educational opportunities the VA offers. Perhaps the most well-known
is the Post-9/11 GI Bill, which offers educational assistance for “the actual
net cost for in-State tuition and fees” for postsecondary education.191
Qualifying veterans may even be eligible for a monthly housing stipend while
in school.192 The Montgomery GI Bill is the predecessor of the Post-9/11 GI

184

VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, supra note 174, at 2.
OUTVETS ET AL., supra note 140, at 2.
186 Id. at 1.
187 Daniel Scapardine, Comment, Leaving “Other Than Honorable” Soldiers Behind: How the
Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs Inadvertently Created a Health and Social Crisis, 76 MD .
L. REV. 1133, 1135–36 (2017).
188 See Alyssa Peterson & Arjun Mody, How Employers Illegally Discriminate Against Veterans
with Less-than-Honorable Discharges, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (May 29, 2018), https://harvardcrcl.org/
how-employers-illegally-discriminate-against-veterans-with-less-than-honorable-discharges (“[A] number
of employers have gone so far as to adopt blanket bans on hiring veterans with bad paper.”). See also
Hugh McClean, Essay, Discharged and Discarded: The Collateral Consequences of a Less-thanHonorable Military Discharge, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2203, 2240–41 (2021).
189 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BOOTED: LACK OF RECOURSE FOR WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED US
MILITARY RAPE SURVIVORS 4 (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/
us0516_militaryweb_1.pdf.
190 OUTVETS ET AL., supra note 140, at 1.
191 38 U.S.C. § 3313(c)(1)(A)(i); see also Post-9/11 GI Bill (Chapter 33), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFS., https://www.va.gov/education/about-gi-bill-benefits/post-9-11/ (July 22, 2022).
192 38 U.S.C. § 3313(c)(1)(B). This housing stipend is calculated using the rate of a service member
at the E-5 pay grade for the zip code in which the educational institution is located. Id.
185
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Bill. Under either law, however, only service members with Honorable
discharges receive these generous benefits.194
The moral injury that many former service members endure may be the
harshest and the least understood collateral consequence. The VA, other
federal and state government entities, and society in general do not recognize
service members with benefits-disqualifying discharges as “veterans.”195
This complete exclusion from the military community can feel like the
ultimate betrayal.196 While the military promotes cohesion above all else,197
the psychological impact of being excluded from the military family cannot
be overstated. One recipient of a benefits-disqualifying discharge described
the feeling as “almost like being a criminal.”198 Service members with
benefits-disqualifying discharges are ostracized from the military
community; they are not even entitled to burial-related benefits, including
burial in a national cemetery199 or a burial flag.200
Former service members with benefits-disqualifying discharges also
have higher rates of suicide, making access to this benefit even more
important.201 The VA reported that, on average, seventeen veterans commit

193 38 U.S.C. § 3011(a)(3)(B); see also Montgomery GI Bill Active Duty (MGIB-AD); U.S. DEP’T
VETERANS AFFS., https://www.va.gov/education/about-gi-bill-benefits/montgomery-active-duty/
(Apr. 20, 2022).
194 38 C.F.R. § 21.9520(a)(2) (2021). Another VA educational benefit afforded to qualifying
veterans is the Veteran Readiness and Employment (VR&E) program. See Veteran Readiness and
Employment (Chapter 31), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., https://www.va.gov/careers-employment/
vocational-rehabilitation/ (Nov. 12, 2021). This program was formerly called Vocational Rehabilitation
and Employment. Id. VR&E is a postsecondary education program that “helps eligible veterans prepare
for, obtain, and maintain suitable employment or achieve independence in daily living.” U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-676, VETERANS AFFAIRS: BETTER UNDERSTANDING NEEDED TO
ENHANCE SERVICES TO VETERANS READJUSTING TO CIVILIAN LIFE 19 (2014). The program offers many
beneficial services including job training, education, and independent living services. Id. However, this
benefit is, once again, limited to those who have “veteran” status and ultimately precludes many with
benefits-disqualifying discharges. Brooker et al., supra note 140, at 46.
195 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
196 Some commentators have described this as “moral injury.” Richard W. Seim, Different
Paths Can Lead to Moral Injury Following Military Trauma, VANTAGE POINT (Mar.
12, 2019), https://blogs.va.gov/VAntage/57448/different-paths-can-lead-to-moral-injury-followingmilitary-trauma/; Jonathan Shay, Moral Injury, 31 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCH. 182, 183 (2014) (defining
moral injury as a “betrayal of what’s right[] by someone who holds legitimate authority (e.g., in the
military—a leader)[] in a high stakes situation”).
197 This is illustrated in the Soldier’s Creed that enlisted Army soldiers often memorize upon entry
into the service. Soldier’s Creed, U.S. ARMY, https://www.army.mil/values/soldiers.html (last visited
Sept. 30, 2022).
198 Kate Murphy, After 50 Years, Vietnam War Veteran Earns Purple Heart with Help of UNC Law
Students, NEWS & OBSERVER (Nov. 5, 2021, 4:47 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/
article255507936.html.
199 38 U.S.C. § 2402.
200 38 U.S.C. § 2301; see Brooker et al., supra note 140, at 51.
201 OUTVETS ET AL., supra note 140, at 1.
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202

suicide every day in 2019.
Former service members with
benefits-disqualifying discharges are “three times more likely to experience
suicidal ideation” than other former military members.203 However, access
to VA health care can essentially eliminate the difference in frequency of
suicidal ideation between the two groups.204
There are other factors not addressed by the proposed test that continue
to impact the exercise of discretion in the military justice system. For
example, the U.S. government has repeatedly acknowledged evidence of
improper racial bias in the system.205 Recent data indicates that such bias
continues to exist.206 Military leaders, scholars, and other stakeholders in the
OFF. OF MENTAL HEALTH AND SUICIDE PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., 2021
NATIONAL VETERAN SUICIDE PREVENTION ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2021), https://mentalhealth.va.gov/
docs/data-sheets/2021/2021-National-Veteran-Suicide-Prevention-Annual-Report-FINAL-9-8-21.pdf.
203 OUTVETS ET AL., supra note 140, at 10. See also Mark A. Reger, Derek J. Smolenski, Nancy
A. Skopp, Melinda J. Metzger-Abamukang, Han K. Kang, Tim A. Bullman, Sondra Perdue & Gregory
A. Gahm, Risk of Suicide Among US Military Service Members Following Operation Enduring Freedom
or Operation Iraqi Freedom Deployment and Separation from the US Military, 72 JAMA PSYCHIATRY
561, 564, 567 (2015) (finding that receiving a less-than-Honorable discharge was a risk factor for
suicide).
204 OUTVETS ET AL., supra note 140, at 10.
205 In 1972, the Secretary of Defense convened a task force to evaluate the administration of military
justice across all branches of service. 1 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES 1 (1972). This task force found that
across all military branches, Black service members received in Fiscal Year 1971 “a lower proportion of
honorable discharges and a higher proportion of general and undesirable [now called Other Than
Honorable] discharges than whites with similar education levels and aptitude.” Id. at 33. The task force
concluded that the military justice system disadvantaged Black service members in the issuance of
military discharges. Id. at 108–11. Similarly, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO, now
the Government Accountability Office) nearly a decade later in 1980 also reported disparate treatment
and the unequal issuance of less-than-Honorable discharges. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., FPCD-80-13,
MILITARY DISCHARGE POLICIES AND PRACTICES RESULT IN WIDE DISPARITIES: CONGRESSIONAL
REVIEW IS NEEDED ii (1980). Specifically, the GAO concluded that less-than-Honorable discharges
disproportionately affected minority service members. Id. at 49–52. The GAO concluded: “Simply
stated, different people get different discharges under similar circumstances, and the type of discharge
an individual gets may have little to do with his behavior and performance on active duty.” Id. at ii.
206 In May 2019, the GAO published a report concluding that race still plays a role in the
administration of military justice and discharge determinations. U.S. GOV ’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-19-344, MILITARY JUSTICE: DOD AND THE COAST GUARD NEED TO IMPROVE THEIR
CAPABILITIES TO ASSESS RACIAL AND GENDER DISPARITIES (2019); see also Racial Disparity in the
Military Justice System—How to Fix the Culture: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Mil. Pers. of the H.
Armed Servs. Comm., 116th Cong. 7–8 (2020) (statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense
Capabilities and Management Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office) (presenting the GAO
report to Congress); CONN. VETERANS LEGAL CTR., DISCRETIONARY INJUSTICE: HOW RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN THE MILITARY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATION SYSTEM HARM BLACK VETERANS
21–22 (2022) (finding that Black service members across all branches, who made up 17.9% of those
separated during the time studied, received only 16.5% of Honorable discharges, but 30% of General and
over 25% of Other Than Honorable discharges). These current and historical studies introduce grave
disparities in the issuance of discharges which is worthy of continued study and analysis. Indeed, the
2021 NDAA instructed the Department of Defense to describe to the GAO how it planned to implement
the recommendations of the 2019 GAO report. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 547, 134 Stat. 1541, 3616–17. The
202
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military justice system must continue to study and analyze this issue to
correct this problem. This Article is designed to complement such research,
as decision makers who embrace the complexities underlying their decisions
are more likely to make more informed and therefore better decisions.
As discussed throughout this section, many of the long-term collateral
consequences to accused service members also adversely impact society.
Service members with bad-paper discharges—those with an Other Than
Honorable discharge or worse—are more likely to have mental health
conditions and suffer from an increased likelihood of suicide, but they are
not eligible for treatment.207 As a senior fellow at the Center for a New
American Society, Phil Carter, explained:
The nation’s long had a social contract with its troops that says
we will send you to war, and when you come home we will
care for you. . . . There’s been this gap; this population that’s
gone to war and earned the benefits of that social contract, but
for whatever reason had these benefits taken away.208
Many of those who fall within that gap are homeless and endure
untreated post-traumatic stress disorder. According to Carter, “the longer
they’re left without help, the higher the cost to society.”209
Service members with benefits-disqualifying discharges are
“overrepresented” in the civilian criminal justice system. Those discharged
with bad paper make up less than five percent of the total military
population, but they account for just over twenty-three percent of military
members in prison and over thirty-three percent of military members in

subsequent GAO report found that the military services had implemented most of the recommendations
on reporting demographic data related to nonjudicial punishment, but that “DOD ha[d] not identified
when disparities should be further reviewed [n]or studied the causes of disparities in the military justice
system.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-105000, MILITARY JUSTICE: DOD AND COAST
GUARD IMPROVED COLLECTION AND REPORTING OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT
DATA, BUT NEED TO STUDY CAUSES OF DISPARITIES 4 (2021).
There is also a correlation between less-than-Honorable discharges and other forms of
discrimination. For example, discrimination based on sexual orientation was the official policy of the
military until “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 10 U.S.C. § 654, was repealed in 2011. See Megan Slack, From
the Archives: The End of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 12, 2012), available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/09/20/archives-end-dont-ask-dont-tell. Of those who
were separated from military service for “homosexuality,” a 1992 GAO study found that “some groups
were consistently discharged at a rate higher than their representation in the total active force or
individual service.” U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., NSIAD-92-98, DEFENSE FORCE MANAGEMENT: DOD’S
POLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY 4 (1992). The study also provides one example of the disproportionate
impact on female service members, who were more likely to be involuntarily separated than male
counterparts on LGBTQ grounds. Id.
207 VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, supra note 174, at 2.
208 Marisa Peñaloza & Quil Lawrence, Other-than-Honorable Discharge Burdens Like a Scarlet
Letter, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 9, 2013, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2013/12/09/249342610/otherthan-honorable-discharge-burdens-like-a-scarlet-letter.
209 Id.
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jail. While states and federal governments have established veterans
treatment courts, designed to divert veterans who commit crimes away from
traditional criminal justice paths, one-third of veterans treatment courts are
unavailable to those with benefits-disqualifying discharges.211
When basing a decision solely on the impact the decision would have
on good order and discipline, military decision makers fail to account for
other important variables. Yet, by employing the modified proportionality
test, military justice decision makers will naturally internalize a duty to
consider the long-term impact of their decisions and render more informed
and well-reasoned decisions.
3. Striking the Balance
The modified proportionality test brings military justice prosecutions in
line with the criteria applied by every other federal prosecutor. While
striking the proper balance in the weighting of the variables, military justice
decision makers will inherently consider the principles of prosecution and
sentencing found in the civilian system.
The principles of federal prosecution found in the Justice Manual212
were “designed to assist in structuring the decision-making process of
attorneys for the government” when making “policy judgment[s] that the
fundamental interests of society require the application of federal criminal
law to a particular set of circumstances.”213 These principles of federal
prosecution acknowledge that exercising prosecutorial discretion is
“recognizing both that serious violations of federal law must be prosecuted”
while also accounting for the “profound consequences for the accused, crime
victims, and their families whether or not a conviction ultimately results.”214
Similarly, the test empowers military justice decision makers to
understand and weigh seemingly incongruent variables when exercising
prosecutorial discretion. This proposed test also mirrors the Justice Manual’s
principles in that both are “designed to assist in structuring the
decision-making process” for decision makers “with a view to providing
guidance rather than . . . mandating results.”215 Akin to the intent of the
federal principles of prosecution, the modified proportionality test affords
210

VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, supra note 174, at 21.
Id. at 21–22.
212 The Justice Manual replaced the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, setting forth the principles of federal
prosecution. The 1980 Principles of Federal Prosecution formed the basis for the principles set forth in
the Justice Manual. As explained in the preface to the Principles of Federal Prosecution in the 2017 U.S.
Attorney’s Manual, “These principles were originally promulgated by Attorney General Benjamin R.
Civiletti on July 28, 1980. While they have since been updated to reflect changes in the law and current
policy of the Department of Justice, the underlying message to federal prosecutors remains unchanged.”
U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’ys’ Manual § 9-27.001 (2017), available at
https://www.justice.gov/archives/usam/archives/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution.
213 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.001 (2020).
214 Id.
215 Id.
211
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the military decision maker with “flexibility” assuring “regularity without
regimentation” and preventing “unwarranted disparity.”216
The federal principles of prosecution set forth in the Justice Manual,
furthermore, nest within the modified proportionality test. Similar to the
federal principles, which “should be read in the broader context of the basic
responsibilities of federal attorneys: making certain that the general purposes
of the criminal law . . . are adequately met, while making certain also that
the rights of individuals are scrupulously protected,”217 the proposed test
likewise can be applied in the broader context of basic responsibilities of
military justice decision makers. The modified proportionality test accounts
not only for the general purposes in criminal law articulated in the Justice
Manual, but it also considers the additional unique variable within the
military justice system—maintenance of good order and discipline.218
The entire framework of the federal principles of prosecution can be
incorporated into the test for military justice decision makers. Employing a
test that inherently incorporates the civilian principles of prosecution may
be exactly what Congress is seeking and ultimately restores faith in the
military justice system.
The modified proportionality test also accounts for the federal principles
of sentencing. Generally, sentencing decisions in the civilian system are
founded upon the sentencing principles articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).219
This statute requires the federal district court sentencing judge to consider:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the
sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 220
The sentence should be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply” with the aforementioned factors.221 The statute affords the federal
sentencing judge with discretion and the flexibility to allocate more weight to
a particular factor or set of factors in light of the individual facts and

216

Id.
Id. § 9-27.110.
218 See supra text accompanying note 104.
219 The Justice Manual also accounts for the sentencing principles in criminal law: “assurance of
warranted punishment, deterrence of further criminal conduct, protection of the public from offenders,
and rehabilitation of offenders.” Just. Manual § 9-27.110.
220 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2).
221 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
217
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circumstances of each case. Section 3553(a) inherently accounts for the
long-term impact on the individual defendant as well as those on society rather
than focusing solely on one variable, the deterrence of criminal conduct.223
The federal sentencing judge weighs all the factors from § 3553(a) while also
accounting for the discretionary guideline sentence set forth in the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual when rendering a criminal sentence.224
Similarly, military decision makers would also consider all the
sentencing principles when applying the modified proportionality test. The
military justice system recognizes five sentencing principles: rehabilitation
of the wrongdoer, specific deterrence of the wrongdoer, general deterrence
of others, retribution, and preservation of good order and discipline.225 In
2016, Congress reaffirmed the importance of these sentencing principles
when legislators amended Article 56 of the UCMJ.226 The federal criminal
sentencing principles are similar to those identified in the military justice
context and offer an important guidepost.227 By employing this test, the
military justice decision maker will naturally account for the sentencing
principles, bringing it more in line with the federal criminal system and
making it more palatable to Congress.
The test enables military decision makers to implicitly incorporate all
the sentencing principles into their decision-making. By analogy, this is akin
to vegetable-infused applesauce for young children. Children need to eat
their vegetables, but they frequently do not like the taste, do not understand
why it is important, and naturally refuse to eat them. Cleverly, parents
find creative ways to get their children to eat vegetables without the kids
222 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 (2005) (noting that Congress created the
statute with a goal of “maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted”).
223 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (listing deterrence as one of four factors informing the need for a
sentence).
224 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (holding that the United States Sentencing Guidelines are advisory,
not mandatory). See generally U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
225 MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 109, para. 2-5-21 (noting that the five recognized
principles of sentencing are “[r]ehabilitation of the wrongdoer, punishment of the wrongdoer, protection
of society from the wrongdoer, preservation of good order and discipline in the military, and deterrence
of the wrongdoer and those who know of [their] crime(s) and [their] sentence . . .”).
226 NDAA 2017, supra note 13, § 5301, 130 Stat. at 2919–20 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 856). Congress
frequently looks to the civilian system as a model for the military justice system. See supra text
accompanying notes 73–74.
227 Compare 10 U.S.C. § 853(c)(1)(B) (instructing courts-martial to consider “the impact of the
offense on . . . the mission, discipline, or efficiency of the command of the accused and any victim of the
offense”), with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (instructing courts to consider federal sentencing guidelines). The
most noteworthy distinction between the military justice system and the federal criminal system is the
military’s added sentencing principle of good order and discipline. See generally Brenner-Beck, supra
note 14, at 108 (analyzing how the good order and discipline concept sets apart military practice from
the federal criminal system). Despite this noteworthy distinction, criminal sentences are based upon
similar justifications for punishment in both the federal civilian and military systems. Ortiz v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2175 (2018) (confirming that military courts are “‘court[s] of law and justice’—
‘bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law’”).
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realizing it. One way is through vegetable-infused applesauce. Many kids
love the taste of the applesauce and often happily ingest it without realizing
that they are also consuming vegetables. Similarly, this test enables
non-attorneys, who likely have not been trained in the sentencing principles
and may not appreciate their importance, to consider all the sentencing
variables without realizing it.228
Considering all the sentencing principles in their decision-making is
particularly important considering military justice decision makers have an
immense amount of discretion. Not only can commanders and military
attorneys use this test in their decision-making, but military judges and
administrative separation board members can also benefit from using this
test. For example, in the court-martial process, military judges are typically
bound only by the applicable maximum sentence of conviction, as military
offenses rarely have a mandatory minimum term of years.229 While Congress
and the President have dictated maximum sentences, “they are set sufficiently
high that they rarely operate as a realistic ceiling.”230 Unlike in the federal
criminal setting, the military justice system does not yet have sentencing
guidelines.231 Thus, military justice decision makers have broad discretion.
The modified proportionality test enables military justice decision
makers to exercise that discretion in an informed and well-reasoned
manner while naturally accounting for all the sentencing principles within
the military justice system. An explanation of how the sentencing
principles within the military justice context interact with the variables of
the modified proportionality test will further illustrate how the weighted
balancing test works.
i.

Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation is an important sentencing principle that is often
overlooked and frequently misunderstood. This principle should not be
viewed solely as one’s potential for continued service. Rather,
rehabilitation is much broader and includes one’s capability for
228 The irony of comparing commanders to children in an article designed to assist military justice
decision makers to maintain prosecutorial discretion is not lost on the authors, but the analogy is
illustrative.
229 See MCM, supra note 8, app. 12 (listing maximum punishments at courts-martial for various
charges). Even spying during wartime, which once held a mandatory of punishment of death, 10 U.S.C.
§ 906 (2012), now carries a punishment of “death or such other punishment as a court-martial or a military
commission may direct.” 10 U.S.C. § 903 (2018). Convictions of certain crimes can carry a mandatory
punitive discharge. For example, punishment for service members found guilty of rape or sexual assault
“shall include dismissal or dishonorable discharge,” with exceptions for plea deals and cooperating with
investigations. 10 U.S.C. § 856(b).
230 Bradford D. Bigler, Rebalancing Military Sentencing: An Argument to Restore Utilitarian
Principles Within the Courtroom, 225 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2017).
231 Compare 10 U.S.C. § 853(c), with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). However, the 2022 NDAA directed that
nonbinding military justice sentencing guidelines be created. NDAA 2022, supra note 2, § 539E, 135
Stat. at 1701–06 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 853A).
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rehabilitation in society in general. “Rehabilitation seeks to accomplish
future crime prevention through reformation” of the wrongdoer. 233 Some
scholars have critiqued the current military justice system as failing to have
a rehabilitative ethic. Scholar and retired Army judge advocate Evan
Seamone argues that the military criminal system undermines rehabilitation
efforts of the wrongdoer.234
Incorporating rehabilitation into the military justice decision-making
process is important because Congress, the final arbiter of the system,
cares. 235 The DoD has likewise recognized its importance. In 2018, while
acting as the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
Robert L. Wilkie issued guidance reaffirming a commitment to the
rehabilitative ethic to DoD boards when reviewing whether to grant
discharge upgrades: “It is consistent with military custom and practice to
honor sacrifices and achievements, to punish only to the extent necessary, to
rehabilitate to the greatest extent possible, and to favor second chances in
situations in which individuals have paid for their misdeeds.”236 This
guidance explicitly states that the military boards should consider “[w]hether
the punishment, including any collateral consequences, was too harsh.”237
As the Manual for Courts-Martial requires in criminal sentencing and the
DoD instructs military discharge boards, military justice decision makers
should similarly account for the impact of collateral consequences on the
offender’s rehabilitation.238
Denying benefits to recipients of benefits-disqualifying discharges
undermines their rehabilitation. Precluding a discharged service member
suffering from a service-connected mental health condition from receiving
VA health care “defies the moral obligation to advance the interests of both
232

232 MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 1001(b)(5) (“‘Rehabilitative potential’ refers to the accused’s
potential to be restored . . . to a useful and constructive place in society.”).
233 Bigler, supra note 230, at 18.
234 Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice: The Suspended
Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders with PTSD and TBI and Reduce Recidivism,
208 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011).
235 In 2018, Congress expanded eligibility for mental and behavioral health care at the VA for
former service members with Other Than Honorable discharges. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 258(a), 132 Stat. 348, 826–28 (2018) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1720I). Congress
passed this legislation in response to the increasing number of veteran suicides. Peggy McCarthy,
Veterans with “Bad Paper” Discharges Now Eligible for Mental Health Services, HARTFORD COURANT
(Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-mental-health-vets-20180327story.html. Although this expansion is limited to veterans who served more than 100 days and were
deployed to a combat operation, or who were victims of sexual assault or harassment in the military, 38
U.S.C. § 1720I(b)(4), it is a reflection that Congress cares about those who have received
benefits-disqualifying discharges.
236 Wilkie Memo, supra note 47, attach. ¶ 6(a).
237 Id. attach. ¶ 7(b).
238 Uniformed officers should bear in mind that there is no expunction process afforded to recipients
of less-than-Honorable discharges. States do not have the authority to change military records or upgrade
discharge characterizations. The only recourse for service members is to request a correction of their
records to DoD boards. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552, 1553.
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the veteran and the society he will rejoin.” When commanders punish
misconduct caused or exacerbated by a mental health condition incurred or
aggravated by military service, the punishment fails to account for the stated
sentencing philosophy of rehabilitation of the offender.240 Instead, it actively
militates against the service member’s rehabilitation efforts.
Imposing a lifetime bar to VA health care on a wounded warrior not
only fails to rehabilitate the individual but can also exacerbate their mental
health condition as it continues to go untreated. 241 The bar “create[s] a class
of individuals whose untreated conditions endanger public safety and the
veterans as they grow worse over time.” 242 The VA system was created
“‘[t]o care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and
his orphan’ by serving and honoring the men and women who are
America’s Veterans.”243 Yet many of those who have borne the battle are
excluded from those life-saving services for conduct that can be explained
or mitigated by their service-inflicted mental health conditions. While not
all service members suffering from a mental health condition who commit
misconduct should remain in the military, it is critical that decision makers
account for the lifelong impact of benefits-disqualifying discharges
permanently undermining the service member’s rehabilitation and second
chance as a civilian.
The modified proportionality test enables military decision makers to
properly account for rehabilitation of the offender by requiring the decision
maker to consider the collateral consequences of the decision.
239

ii. Just Punishment
In addition to rehabilitation, punishing the wrongdoer is another
sentencing principle in the military justice system. 244 Punishment of the
offender may also be called retribution. 245 This sentencing principle also

239 Seamone, supra note 234, at 3. See also VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, supra note 174, at 8
(explaining that “[t]he stakes could not be higher. Exclusion from the VA means the denial of housing
for those who are homeless, the denial of healthcare for those who are disabled, and the denial of support
to those whose disabilities prevent them from working.”) (footnote omitted).
240 Seamone, supra note 234, at 3. Rules for Court Martial 1002(f) states in part that when imposing
a sentence, the court-martial should take into consideration a number of factors including “the need for
the sentence to . . . rehabilitate the accused.” MCM, supra note 8, R.C.M. 1002(f)(3).
241 See Joel L. Young, Untreated Mental Illness, PSYCH. TODAY (Dec. 30, 2015),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/when-your-adult-child-breaks-your-heart/201512/untreatedmental-illness (“The most obvious effect of untreated mental illness is a steady—and often rapid—
decline in mental health. Mental illness will not go away on its own, and the longer it persists, the harder
it is to treat.”).
242 Seamone, supra note 234, at 3.
243
Mission, Vision, Core Values & Goals, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS.,
https://www.va.gov/about_va/mission.asp (Mar. 26, 2021) (quoting President Abraham Lincoln, Second
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865)).
244 MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 109, para. 2-5-21.
245 Bigler, supra note 230, at 16.
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accounts for the seriousness of the offense.
In determining the
seriousness of the offense, military justice decision makers should consider
the holistic impact on the victim, including the economic, physical, and
psychological impacts of the offense.247 Like civilian federal prosecutors,
they must also consider the broader impact of the offense on the military
and civilian community. 248
Serious egregious conduct calls for serious punishment.249
Correspondingly, the victim’s right to accountability for the crime and
justice is a significant consideration in prosecutorial decision-making.250
The test accounts for the long-term impact of the offense on the victim as
part of the good order and discipline variable. In the test, military justice
decision makers consider the victim’s needs and interests as the preeminent
independent variable, as they are inextricably intertwined with the
maintenance of good order and discipline.
Military justice decision makers, particularly for less serious crimes,
should not simply narrowly consider whether the accused service member
is, in fact, punished. Rather, military justice decision makers should also
account for the long-term consequences to the individual wrongdoer and to
society when making decisions. The modified proportionality test ensures
consideration of the immediate impact of the punishment as well as the
long-term consequences to both the accused service member and society.
In many cases, the cost to society does not disappear but rather is shifted
elsewhere. Specifically, there is a large cost to society when
less-than-Honorable discharges bar the former service member from health
care and benefits at the VA.251 This shifts the burden from the immense,
often issue-focused resources at the VA, to local communities, informal
family networks, and nonprofit organizations.252 This burden-shifting has
been described as “self-defeating.”253 In particular, discharged service
members suffering from untreated PTSD are “already prone to violent
outbursts and loss of impulse control[,] rais[ing] concerns fundamental to
our self-interest as a nation.”254 Shifting the burden away from the VA to
MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 109, para. 2-5-21.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.230 (2020).
248 See id. (instructing that law enforcement resources should be directed toward “the national
priorities” as well as “problems of particular local or regional significance.”)
249 See, e.g., Kyle Rempfer, Army Chief Warrant Officer Sentenced to Life in Prison over Sexual
Assault of a Minor, ARMY TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/
2020/07/09/army-chief-warrant-officer-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-over-sexual-assault-of-a-minor
(reporting that former Army Chief Warrant Officer Daniel Kemp was sentenced to life in prison for
repeatedly sexually abusing his adopted children).
250 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.230 (2020).
251 Maxine Waters & Jonathan Shay, Opinion, Heal the “Bad Paper” Veterans, N.Y. TIMES (July
30, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/30/opinion/heal-the-bad-paper-veterans.html.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Brooker et al., supra note 140, at 15.
246
247
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larger society is not invisible—“when we are willing to look they re-emerge
from obscurity in the homeless shelters, prisons and jails, and morgues of
every city and state in the nation.”255
The test also accounts for the effect on the offender service member’s
family. The collateral consequences of a benefits-disqualifying discharge
may be trebled when they reach a separated service member’s family,
particularly if military service caused a disability. These consequences are
often the same for minor offenses as for much more serious felony
convictions. For example, Survivors’ and Dependents’ Educational
Assistance (DEA) benefits are available to dependents of a permanently and
totally disabled service-connected veteran.256 This program offers education
and training to qualified dependents of disabled veterans.257 In addition to
being precluded from receiving educational benefits, family members of
service members with benefits-disqualifying discharges lose access to free
or affordable health care, and may also be precluded from receiving
monetary benefits.258
Notably, the most serious offenses are not impacted by the modified
proportionality test. Military justice decision makers should still go through
the analysis in every case, as there may be small ways to serve justice by
taking care of the offender’s family, particularly in situations in which a
family member is a victim of the offender’s crime. 259
Employing the modified proportionality test will enable military justice
decision makers to view the process and their decisions holistically,
including accounting for all aspects of the sentencing principle of punishing
the wrongdoer.
iii. Protection of Society
The third sentencing principle in the military justice system is protecting
society from the offender. Society must be protected from the possibility of
the service member committing future crimes. Military justice decision
makers must account for the broader risks that the accused service member

255

Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
38 U.S.C. § 3501(a)(1).
257 38 U.S.C. §§ 3500–3501. Furthermore, individual states offer even more generous educational
opportunities to veterans’ family members. For instance, in Texas, the Hazlewood Act provides qualified
veterans, spouses and dependent children with an allotted tuition exemption at public institutions of
higher education in Texas. TEX. EDUC. CODE tit. 3, § 54.341 (2013). However, benefits under the
Hazlewood Act are only available for those who receive an Honorable or General discharge and their
dependents. Hazlewood and Education Services, TEX. VETERANS COMM., https://www.tvc.texas.gov/
education/hazlewood/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2022).
258 The VA offers survivors of veterans who die while on active duty or because of
service-connected disabilities monthly insurance benefits and tax-free dependency and indemnity
compensation (DIC). 38 U.S.C. §§ 1312–1313.
259 10 U.S.C. § 1059; 32 C.F.R. § 111.1–111.6 (2021); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 1342.24,
TRANSITIONAL COMPENSATION (TC) FOR ABUSED DEPENDENTS (23 Sept. 2019).
256
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poses beyond the immediate impact on the unit. The modified proportionality
test empowers decision makers to analyze their cases more broadly.
The modified proportionality test also accounts for the fact that service
members are punished for crimes that are not criminalized in the civilian
world. The military justice system punishes people whose crimes were
specific to the military but pose no risk to society otherwise. Service
members who receive benefits-disqualifying discharges can endure
civilian-life consequences for military-specific crimes. For example, a
service member can be administratively separated with an OTH discharge—
even in peacetime—for absence without leave, disrespect, disobedience,
insubordinate conduct, and failure to obey an order.260 This test forces
decision makers, often for the first time, to consider the lifelong impact of
their decisions for someone simply not coming to work on an ordinary day
in garrison.261
Nothing in this test requires a specific decision. Although the above
example discusses a case where military decision makers fail to use the test,
resulting in an overly harsh decision, there is nothing in the test that prevents
severe consequences in cases that warrant them. In the military justice
system, the consequences need not be limited to a lengthy term of
imprisonment but also could result in the removal of benefits if the crime so
warrants it.
iv. Specific Deterrence
Specific deterrence of the offender “seeks to preclude future crime by
incapacitating the criminal for the future commission of crime.”262
Surprisingly, however, service members are frequently unaware of the
likelihood or impact of a benefits-disqualifying discharge.263 While service
members facing a less-than-Honorable discharge may be warned prior to
their separation that they may lose some or all their VA benefits, many have
no idea they are actually likely to lose benefits, nor are they certain they will
ever need those benefits.264 Accordingly, the deterrent effect upon the
individual service member is nearly “negligible.”265

260 10 U.S.C. §§ 886 (AWOL), 889 (disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer), 890
(willfully disobeying a superior commissioned officer), 891 (insubordinate conduct), 892 (failure to obey
an order). Under the 2022 NDAA, commanders still have prosecutorial discretion for these crimes. See
supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
261 This example is not contemplating more aggravated AWOL circumstances.
262 Bigler, supra note 230, at 18.
263 Jeremy R. Bedford, Other Than Honorable Discharges: Unfair and Unjust Life Sentences of
Decreased Earning Capacity, 6 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFFS. 687, 703–05 (2021).
264 Id. at 704–05; VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, supra note 174, at 11 (finding that the VA denied
eighty-five percent of veterans with bad-paper discharges who applied for benefits).
265 Bedford, supra note 263, at 704 (“While no comprehensive study exists analyzing the deterrent
effect of potential loss of disability compensation, numerous criminological studies show that certainty
of punishment has a larger deterrent effect than the severity of punishment.”)
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The modified proportionality test overcomes the pervasive lack of
understanding among military justice decision makers of the least
understood and most often overlooked collateral consequences. The test
naturally
incorporates
the
collateral
consequences
of
a
benefits-disqualifying discharge in the decision-making process.
Furthermore, the test enables decision makers to account for the longevity
and permanency of their decisions on the offender. Defense counsel
employing the test will also be better able to inform their clients about the
long-term impact of the possible dispositions.
The test accounts for the application of this principle in the context of
military-specific crimes. When a service member receives a
benefits-disqualifying discharge for military-specific crimes, the specific
deterrence variable does not apply. When the military separates a service
member for military-only crimes, they are not deterred from committing
those crimes again because the conduct is not a crime in the civilian sector.
The test considers that specific deterrence as a sentencing principle is not
achieved in this context, and therefore it does not overestimate the deterrent
effect when weighing the variables.
Military justice decision makers must use their individual discretion
depending on the decision to be made. If a service member commits a violent
offense, for example, the test will allow for punishment with a focus on
specific deterrence. In those circumstances, the collateral consequences,
such as the loss of VA benefits, may not be excessive. The application of the
test does not prevent the exercise of prosecutorial discretion necessary to
deter the wrongdoer.
v. General Deterrence
General deterrence is not focused on the wrongdoer, but rather “hopes
to dissuade others from the commission of future crime through the
punishment imposed in the current case.”266 This sentencing principle is
related to, but distinct from, impact on good order and discipline. Not
directly focused on reducing crime, good order and discipline “seeks to
produce a disciplined unit, with crime reduction being one of the many
positive externalities.”267 The Justice Manual emphasizes the importance of
this sentencing principle: “Deterrence of criminal conduct, whether it be
criminal activity generally or a specific type of criminal conduct, is one of
the primary goals of the criminal law.”268
The modified proportionality test allows for general deterrence to be
weighted more heavily in the appropriate case. The test enables military
justice decision makers to look beyond deterring service members in the
unit. It requires that military justice decision makers adopt a broader vision
266

Bigler, supra note 230, at 18.
Id.
268 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.230 (2020).
267
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of whom they wish to deter. For example, in a child rape case, the military
justice decision maker should not only be focused on deterring service
members in that unit, but they should also be mindful of deterring society at
large from this horrific behavior.
Yet, in other cases, the test prevents military justice decision makers
from overestimating the impact of general deterrence. Decision makers in
the civilian system frequently miscalculate the impact of a punishment’s
ability to deter others.269 Relatedly, the Non-Binding Disposition Guidance’s
nearly sole focus on maintenance of good order and discipline reflects the
military justice system’s overemphasis of this variable.270 Good order and
discipline is the independent and preeminent variable. However, it is not the
only variable in the equation.
While striking the proper balance in the weighting of the variables,
military justice decision makers would also inherently consider all the
sentencing principles when applying this test. As the Justice Manual
instructs federal civilian prosecutors, the proposed test also provides the
military justice decision makers with a convenient tool for exercising
prosecutorial discretion while “promot[ing] consistency” across the
branches of the military without “rigid uniformity.”271
III. CASE ILLUSTRATIONS
Using the modified proportionality test, this part illustrates how the
test works in two applied examples. 272 The examples will demonstrate that
military justice decision makers can employ the test in both types of cases
described in the 2022 NDAA—non “covered offenses” where
commanders will still exercise prosecutorial discretion, as well as “covered
offenses” where uniformed judge advocates will exercise prosecutorial
discretion. 273 The test variables are presented in a sequential order, but
their analysis will often occur simultaneously or, perhaps, in a different
order. Please note that the following examples include discussion of
violence, death, and sexual assault.

269 See generally Johannes Andenaes, General Prevention Revisited: Research and Policy
Implications, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 338 (1975) (discussing research on general deterrence and
pointing to several studies showing that the impact on general deterrence is overestimated); see also Tom
Tyler, Yale L. Sch., Presentation at the SELA Meeting: Legitimacy and the Maintenance of Public Order
5 (June 7–10, 2012), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/sela/Tyler_Mexico_talk_
final.pdf (noting that studies generally conclude that “deterrence is found to have, at best, a small
influence on people’s behavior,” while “[m]ore general reviews of deterrence research conclude that the
relationship between risk judgments and crime was ‘modest to negligible’”).
270 See generally MCM, supra note 8, app. 2.1.
271 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.140 (2020).
272 The cases presented in this section are fictional and designed solely to explain the application of
the modified proportionality test.
273 NDAA 2022, supra note 2, § 533, 135 Stat. at 1695–96 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801).
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A. Minor Misconduct
Lance Corporal (LCpl) Mandy Lopez enlisted in the Marine Corps at
age seventeen. She chose to be an aircraft rescue and firefighting specialist;
after her initial training went well, she was stationed in Okinawa, Japan.
A few months later, a Japanese submarine patrol plane crashed on its
approach into the Marine Corps air station. The aircraft flipped and burst
into flames. LCpl Lopez and other Marines from her crew were the first on
the scene. After extinguishing enough flames, the crew approached the
wreckage to look for survivors. LCpl Lopez found one survivor barely
hanging on to life. LCpl Lopez immediately recognized the man as her friend
Kenji. She carried Kenji away from the wreckage. Kenji later died in LCpl
Lopez’s arms. Despite the carnage, LCpl Lopez’s unit did not offer anyone
counseling. LCpl Lopez and her friends never talked about what happened.
About five months following the plane crash, LCpl Lopez and her unit
were in South Korea on a joint training exercise when a Marine Corps
helicopter crashed after hitting power lines. LCpl Lopez and her crew were
the first to arrive. She was ordered to place body parts into trash bags
because the crash site was in a swampy area. When she was relieved many
hours later, she went back to her tent and could not process anything. She
felt numb.
After this second crash, LCpl Lopez began to drink alcohol for the first
time in her life. After many months, however, the alcohol did not change
how she felt. After two years in Okinawa, she transferred back to a duty
station in Cherry Point, North Carolina, near where she grew up. She wanted
to be near her family. When she saw her family members again, they
immediately noticed a change. LCpl Lopez would get angry easily and did
not seem to have many friends. She was totally different than the teenager
who left just a little more than two years before.
While LCpl Lopez was stationed at Cherry Point, an old high school
friend introduced her one Sunday to marijuana. She tried it without even
thinking about it. The next day, when LCpl Lopez reported for duty, she was
randomly selected for a urinalysis. Before the results of the urinalysis were
back, LCpl Lopez admitted to her chain of command that she had used
marijuana. She was perfunctorily enrolled in mandatory drug and alcohol
counseling and shown no emotional support. She felt like she had let
everyone down and even contemplated suicide.
Later that same week, LCpl Lopez was late to formation. She slept
through physical training at 0630 but was present for work call at 0900. The
command could not believe that LCpl Lopez was late. The unit added a
failure to repair charge to the nonjudicial punishment it issued later that
week. Among other punishments, her commander reduced LCpl Lopez to
the rank of Private, the lowest enlisted rank.
During her drug and alcohol counseling, now-Private (Pvt) Lopez’s
counselor recommended that she go to the mental health clinic on post.
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Pvt Lopez trusted her counselor, so she went. After several appointments, a
psychologist diagnosed her with PTSD and major depressive disorder.
After she served the punishment, Pvt Lopez’s First Sergeant called her
into an office and showed her paperwork that said that she was being
considered for separation from the Marine Corps for illegal drug use. The
First Sergeant said that she could “make it easy” by waiving her rights to an
administrative separation board and to an attorney. Crushed and feeling
helpless, Pvt Lopez waived her rights.
The entire chain of command recommended an OTH discharge
characterization. In his recommendation for an OTH discharge
characterization, the company commander stated, “Drug use is not
tolerable.” The battalion commander stated, “Must send a strong message
that this is not OK.” The brigade commander reasoned, “Support chain of
command’s recommendations.” The staff judge advocate did not justify her
recommendation for an OTH discharge in writing, and the Commanding
General did not provide any rationale for approving the chain of command’s
unanimous recommendations.
Life after military service was difficult for now-Ms. Lopez. She started
living at home again despite having saved some money from her time in
service. She thought about suicide many times. At her mother’s behest, she
applied to be a firefighter at multiple fire departments, only to be
immediately denied upon showing the hiring manager her DD Form 214,
which reflected her OTH discharge for “Pattern of Misconduct.” One day
while sitting at home, a Marine friend called Ms. Lopez to check on her and
give her some advice. The friend, who had been diagnosed with PTSD, had
started seeing a therapist at the closest Vet Center, a VA-funded resource
that provides counseling to many former service members. The friend
convinced Ms. Lopez to call the Vet Center, but because Ms. Lopez had
neither deployed in support of a contingency operation nor was a victim of
Military Sexual Trauma, the Vet Center would not see her.
After the Vet Center denied her, Ms. Lopez effectively gave up on life,
and her mother noticed. Her mother, worried that her daughter would kill
herself, convinced Ms. Lopez to go to the emergency room. She saw a
psychiatrist, who, after a short interview, agreed with the previous PTSD
and major depressive disorder diagnoses and opined that they began with the
trauma associated with the aircraft crashes in Asia. Things started to get a
bit better after Ms. Lopez started taking antidepression medication and found
a civilian therapist. She found a job working for a family friend on a
landscaping crew.
Ms. Lopez never earned much more than minimum wage over the next
ten years, as no large company would hire her with her discharge type and
characterization. She lost eligibility for health insurance on her parents’ plan
as of her twenty-sixth birthday, and she could no longer afford her sporadic
therapy appointments. Upon losing health insurance, Ms. Lopez went to the
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local VA Health Clinic, as she had received a letter from VA several years
back telling her that she might be eligible for health care coverage.
Unfortunately, when the clerk looked at her DD Form 214, he turned her
away and told her to come back if she got a discharge upgrade.
Ms. Lopez, now thirty, works as a long-haul truck driver. While she likes
the solitude and seeing the country, she feels lost. Every time she looks for
another job, nobody will hire her with her DD Form 214 stating that she
committed misconduct and that her discharge was not under honorable
conditions. Without treatment, she continues to feel depressed and
contemplates suicide again.
While there is little question that then-LCpl Lopez should have faced
consequences for marijuana use, her command’s sole focus on the
anticipated impact that the disposition decision would have on good order
and discipline created easily predictable permanent consequences. The
command was fully aware of LCpl Lopez’s diagnoses, and it understood that
self-medication is a classic symptom of undiagnosed and untreated PTSD,274
but it simply did not care.
If LCpl Lopez’s command had applied the modified proportionality test,
it may have arrived at a different decision on how to handle LCpl Lopez’s
misconduct. At a bare minimum, it would have made a more informed
decision. In this applied example, the command did not hesitate to perform
the typical analysis of the independent variable—the “anticipated impact the
decision would have on the maintenance of good order and discipline.”
Nonetheless, the command failed to specifically articulate how it believed
an administrative separation with an OTH discharge characterization would
maintain good order and discipline, providing nothing beyond perfunctory
statements of intolerance and general deterrence in the unit. To compare this
with a targeting decision, the command did not articulate the concrete and
direct advantage anticipated.
Decision makers who adopt a practice to provide more granularity in
their recommendation, however, are forced to think about the issue more
deeply, and might even seek advice on general deterrence from a judge
advocate. They must articulate the anticipated impact on good order and
discipline, including how long the impact would last. Even if the ultimate
decision about the impact that the action would have on maintaining good
order and discipline does not change, the decision is less likely to be based
on emotion, bias, and flawed heuristics, as the justification would be
reviewable, discussable, and debatable. This logic would also place the

274 See Murdoch Leeies et al., The Use of Alcohol and Drugs to Self-Medicate Symptoms of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 27 DEPRESSION & ANXIETY 731, 731 (2010) (finding that
“[s]elf-medication is a common behavior among people with PTSD in the [general population], yet has
potentially hazardous consequences”).
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decision maker more in line with decision makers in the civilian system who
often must justify their prosecutorial or sentencing decisions.275
The starkest omission in this case, however, was the lack of attention to
the easily anticipatable collateral consequences. The first collateral
consequences that the command should have assessed were those to Ms.
Lopez. Even a cursory look at readily available resources would have
informed both the command and staff judge advocate that their actions
would serve as a form of a harsh life sentence for Ms. Lopez.
If Ms. Lopez’s leaders had applied the test and considered the collateral
consequences of their decision, they would have learned that she would
likely be permanently barred from receiving VA health care benefits for the
PTSD and major depressive disorder that her military service caused and are
well-documented in her service treatment records. While Ms. Lopez is
legally entitled to VA health care for service-connected conditions like
these, the VA’s malfeasance in caring for former service members like Ms.
Lopez is well-documented and essentially universal.276 Further, Ms. Lopez
is not eligible for counseling at VA-funded Vet Centers.277 Given that former
service members with mental health diagnoses have a “significantly elevated
suicide risk,”278 the unarticulated, and therefore more likely to be
uninformed and unchecked, decisions based solely on an estimated impact
on good order and discipline can be foreseeably deadly.
Beyond health care benefits, the decision makers never considered that
their decision permanently barred Ms. Lopez from receiving education
benefits, disability compensation, and almost all other VA benefits. In
addition to revoking her eligibility for GI Bill benefits, the OTH discharge
characterization bars her from participating in VA-sponsored Veteran
Readiness and Education programs designed to help her transition from the
military to the civilian workforce.
The decision makers did not consider the likely lifetime “scarlet letter”
nature of the discharge type and characterization they based solely on a gut
feeling about the impact on good order and discipline. Absent a change to
her discharge characterization, which is unlikely,279 she will forever be
saddled with the language “Pattern of Misconduct” and “Other Than
Honorable,” any time she applies for a job or to go to college.280 As with the
275

See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text.
OUTVETS ET AL., supra note 140, at 17–22.
277 See 38 C.F.R. § 17.2000 (2021) (explaining eligibility for readjustment counseling for service
members and their families).
278
Rajeev
Ramchand,
Suicide
Among
Veterans,
RAND
CORP.
(2021),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1363-1.html.
279 See Steve Beynon, “Thousands” of Veterans with Bad Paper Discharges Might Not Know They
Can Upgrade, STARS & STRIPES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.stripes.com/veterans/thousands-ofveterans-with-bad-paper-discharges-might-not-know-they-can-upgrade-1.647817 (noting that obtaining
a discharge upgrade is “not easy” and “can involve legal hurdles and a lengthy bureaucratic process”).
280 See supra note 186–89 and accompanying text.
276
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other collateral consequences, the impact may be permanent, even though
the impact the decision had on good order and discipline was fleeting.
The related impact on society will also be profound. Society will never
benefit from Ms. Lopez reaching her full potential and contributing fully to
society, as her discharge status significantly compromises her employability.
Following the Vietnam War, the Joint-Service Study Group concluded that
employers prefer honorably discharged veterans to nonveterans, but prefer
nonveterans to veterans with less-than-Honorable discharges.281 Further, the
Joint-Service Study Group found that “there is a distinct hierarchy of
employer preference which parallels the severity of the discharges.”282
Discharge-based discrimination continues to this day.283 For behavior
that is no longer consistently prosecuted in most of the United States, Ms.
Lopez’s commanders assessed, even if unknowingly, that this young woman
who volunteered to serve in the Marine Corps should have a tangible and
irreversible negative impact on her employability, and should likely never
hold a job with any government organization or a leadership role in a large
corporation. While working as a long-haul truck driver is an honorable and
critically important job, Ms. Lopez wishes she had other options. She does
not, however, and likely never will.
The impact to society was simply ignored. For instance, the complete
failure of decision makers to consider the impact of their decisions on mental
health access is a significant contributor to the veteran suicide epidemic.
Without VA mental health treatment, former service members like Ms.
Lopez have a thirty percent higher suicide rate than those whose access has
not been barred.284 “While the suicide rate for those in VA care is falling,
the rate for those veterans outside VA care is increasing.”285 As a result,
commanders must be aware of their power in addressing the veteran suicide
epidemic when they make decisions that could bar a service member’s
access to health care.
Relatedly, state and local governments and nonprofit organizations must
bear the cost of and responsibility for treating and caring for former service
members like Ms. Lopez, even though their disabilities are directly related
to military service. Without even realizing it, the decision makers in
281

U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., FPCD-80-13, MILITARY DISCHARGE POLICIES AND PRACTICES RESULT
53 (1980).
282 Id.
283 See, e.g., Peterson & Mody, supra note 188; Marcy L. Karin, “Other Than Honorable”
Discrimination, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 135, 156–79 (2016) (examining the impact of OTH
discharges in the context of reemployment protection).
284 VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, supra note 174, at 21.
285 Id.; see also OFF . OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUICIDE PREVENTION , U.S. D EP’T OF VETERANS
AFFS ., 2020 NATIONAL VETERAN
SUICIDE
PREVENTION ANNUAL REPORT 18,
https://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/docs/data-sheets/2020/2020-National-Veteran-Suicide-PreventionAnnual-Report-11-2020-508.pdf (finding that the suicide rate of veterans with recent VA health care
use decreased by 2.4 percent between 2017 and 2018, while the suicide rate of those without such use
increased by 2.5 percent).
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Ms. Lopez’s case have effectively absolved the federal government of all
responsibility for Ms. Lopez’s well-being, even though her military service
indisputably caused the problem. Members of Congress have repeatedly
expressed increased interest in providing ongoing care to former service
members suffering with mental health diagnoses.286
Former service members with untreated mental health conditions like Ms.
Lopez are also more likely to commit crimes.287 Finally, many former service
members with discharge types and characterizations like Ms. Lopez are
homeless because of the devastating impact of the collateral consequences.
Despite massive VA efforts to prevent veteran homelessness,288 such efforts
are largely unavailable for former service members like Ms. Lopez because of
the type and characterization of their discharge.
Decisions that have such a large societal impact, such as on veteran
suicide, incarceration, and homelessness, must be made holistically. While
the impact of a decision on good order and discipline is critically important,
the concrete and direct impact of the decision is largely fleeting, whereas the
collateral consequences are permanent. It appears that decision makers may
not realize the immense impact their decisions have not just on their unit,
but as importantly, the individuals involved in the process and the entire
nation. Employing the modified proportionality test is a method to help
prevent the irresponsible use of power that Congress increasingly laments.
Had the decision makers in this case performed the modified
proportionality test, they would have spotted these issues and explored
options to maintain good order and discipline without disproportionate
collateral consequences. To use a targeting analogy, they could have chosen
a different weaponeering solution to reduce the risk of collateral damage
while still achieving the intended effect.
For example, while adjudging an Honorable or General discharge
characterization is always an option to preserve benefits, it often is not the
only option. If Ms. Lopez had been separated solely for her drug use and not
also because of lateness, her misconduct-based discharge with an OTH
characterization would not have legally disqualified her from VA benefits.
In this case, the VA disqualified Ms. Lopez because it determined that her
misconduct was “willful and persistent.”289 Because the unit did not apply
the modified proportionality test, it failed to consider that a simple
modification of the basis of separation could serve the intended effect of
general deterrence while also not legally precluding Ms. Lopez from VA
286 For example, in 2016, Congress passed the Fairness for Veterans Amendment to provide more
favorable discharge characterization reviews to many suffering from service-related mental health
conditions. NDAA 2017, supra note 13, § 535, 130 Stat. at 2123–24 (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 1553(d)(3)); see supra note 46.
287 VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, supra note 174, at 2, 21.
288 For a summary of ongoing efforts, see VA Homeless Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS.,
https://www.va.gov/homeless/ (Sept. 2, 2022).
289 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d)(4) (2021).
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benefits, including health care. Further, the command and defense counsel
could have mitigated the risk that the VA would misjudge Ms. Lopez’s
benefits eligibility by linking her with a veterans service organization (VSO)
or law clinic before her separation, while also explicitly indicating in the
administrative separation record that the discharge was not based on
persistent misconduct.290 The resources to perform this analysis and make
such indications to the VA have been available for almost a decade.291
The modified proportionality test is simply an attempt to get those who
make decisions within the military justice system to consider what has been
known for decades. During the Vietnam War, a 1972 DoD task force
concluded, “The combination of penalties imposed by other than honorable
discharges consign many veterans to a hopeless cycle of: Joblessness,
perpetual underemployment, drug addiction, chronic disease and despair, a
life of poverty, crime and imprisonment.”292
Fifty years later, decision makers in the military justice system are still
ignoring these collateral consequences. While such ignorance was tolerated
for decades, the 2022 NDAA has changed the operating environment.
B. Serious Misconduct
The modified proportionality test is designed to work not just for minor
misconduct but also in cases involving more serious crimes. Consider a
fictional sexual assault case that resembles common ones in the military
justice system.293
After graduating from high school and enlisting in the Army for four
years of active duty, then-Private Soren Miller graduated from his initial entry
training as an infantryman. Two years after enlisting, now-Sergeant Miller
deployed with his unit to Afghanistan. During his year-long deployment, he
fought in numerous engagements, earning a Combat Infantryman Badge.
Despite his steady performance and strong leadership skills, Sergeant Miller
saw horrific things. Upon redeployment to his home duty station, Sergeant
Miller experienced flashbacks and nightmares and became hypervigilant. He
started drinking alcohol excessively and attempted suicide. Sergeant Miller

290 For specific guidance, see Brooker et al., supra note 140, at 186–90, 192–94. The command
could also take steps to increase the likelihood that Ms. Lopez could get the VA health care to which she
is entitled even with an Other Than Honorable discharge characterization, but such action itself proves
the value of the modified proportionality test, as the test would make them aware that such mitigating
steps are possible and potentially necessary.
291 Id. at 192–94.
292 Administrative Discharge Procedures and Discharge Review: Hearings on H.R. 52, H.R. 262,
H.R. 548, H.R. 549, H.R. 647, H.R. 867, H.R. 1186, H.R. 2455, H.R. 2964, H.R. 5254, H.R. 5305, H.R.
5306, H.R. 5307, H.R. 5592, & H.R. 7584 by the Subcomm. on Mil. Pers. of the H. Armed Servs. Comm.,
94th Cong. 453 (1975) (statement of Rep. Louis Stokes).
293 See supra notes 10–11.
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visited the on-post mental health clinic several times, culminating in an Army
psychiatrist diagnosing him with PTSD.294
A few months later, Sergeant Miller was assigned to supervise another
soldier, Private Naomi Smith. Private Smith was one of very few women in
their nearly all-male infantry unit. Sergeant Miller made several sexual
advances, including asking her out and commenting on her appearance.
Private Smith rejected his advances, which made Sergeant Miller angry.
One evening during a party at the junior enlisted barracks, Sergeant
Miller saw Private Smith. He offered Private Smith a cup of alcohol, which
she accepted. About an hour later, Sergeant Miller asked Private Smith if
they could go to a more private place to talk. Private Smith looked uneasy
but agreed, and they both walked upstairs to her room. After a few minutes
of talking alone in her room, Sergeant Miller attempted to kiss Private Smith,
but she pushed him away. Sergeant Miller grew enraged, pushed her onto
her bed, and sexually assaulted her.295
The next day, Private Smith confided in a friend about what had
happened. The friend encouraged her to tell her first sergeant what
happened. A few days later, Private Smith told her first sergeant that
Sergeant Miller sexually assaulted her. Her first sergeant immediately
reported the assault to the company commander. The command team
ensured Private Smith was assigned a special victims’ counsel (SVC).296 The
command team also reported the assault to the U.S. Army Criminal
Investigation Division (CID).297 After talking to her SVC, Private Smith
decided to cooperate with law enforcement and file an unrestricted report.298
The first place military justice decision makers could employ the
modified proportionality test is in deciding which level of disposition is
appropriate. Pursuant to the 2022 NDAA, the decision maker in this
hypothetical is the special trial counsel.299
294 For purposes of this hypothetical, assume that the medical provider did not issue Sergeant Miller
a profile as he was still able to perform his regularly required duties. A “profile” consists of
documentation of a service member’s physical limitations and serves as the medical provider’s
recommendation to the service member’s commander.
295 For purposes of this example, the term “sexual assault” is used in a colloquially broad context
to include the most serious of the offenses under UCMJ Article 120. See 10 U.S.C. § 920 (defining rape,
sexual assault, aggravated sexual conduct, and abusive sexual contact).
296 A special victims’ counsel (SVC) is a uniformed judge advocate who represents the interests
of the victim. The SVC’s primary duty is to represent the best interests of the victim client. Army
Special Victims’ Counsel, JAGCNET , https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/Sites/SVCounsel.nsf (last visited
Oct. 2, 2022).
297 CID is the primary federal law enforcement agency for the Army. CID Mission, DEP’T OF THE
ARMY: CRIM. INVESTIGATION DIV., https://www.cid.army.mil/mission.html (Sept. 9, 2022).
298 In the military, sexual assault and rape victims have the option of filing an unrestricted report or
restricted report. While an unrestricted report will trigger the initiation of an official criminal
investigation, a restricted report will not. 32 C.F.R. § 103.6(a) (2021).
299 If the case took place prior to the implementation of the 2022 NDAA, this decision would be
withheld to the first O-6 commander in the accused service member’s chain of command. See
Withholding Initial Disposition Authority, supra note 98.
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Employing the test, the independent variable to consider is the
preservation of good order and discipline, and one must articulate the
rationale. Here, the accused service member sexually assaulted a subordinate
soldier. There are very few things that can undermine good order and
discipline more than a superior soldier subjecting a subordinate to sexual
violence. This horrific crime was a complete violation of trust. It erodes the
very unit cohesion necessary to produce a disciplined force. The military
justice system would also lose credibility if it failed to hold Sergeant Miller
accountable, thereby further undermining good order and discipline.
Relatedly, the impact of a harsh punishment could have a positive impact on
good order and discipline.
The level of disposition must also account for the seriousness of the
offense, which includes the impact on the victim and military community.
Private Smith is deserving of justice and accountability for the crime to
which she was subjected. There is also a need to choose a disposition method
that would protect other members of the unit from Sergeant Miller if he is
found guilty. Ensuring that he does not commit this crime again is
paramount. Simply discharging him from the military would not address the
real risk he poses to society. Incapacitating him—only a court-marital can
impose imprisonment—may be necessary. Others beyond those in his unit
must also be dissuaded from committing the crime.
After articulating this rationale to their superior, the special trial counsel
decides that the best thing to do to maintain good order and discipline is to
refer the case to the most serious level of court-martial, general court-martial.
But the special trial counsel’s analysis does not stop there. Before they
make a final decision, they analyze the dependent variable, the collateral
consequences to the accused service member, society, and the victim in light
of the federal prosecution and sentencing principles.
The collateral consequences to Sergeant Miller are significant. He was
in several firefights in Afghanistan, attempted suicide, and was diagnosed
with PTSD. If he is issued a punitive discharge at a court-martial, he will
receive a lifetime bar from not only receiving disability compensation for
any service-connected injuries post-discharge, but he will also be barred
from health care at the VA for his service-connected PTSD. His ability to be
rehabilitated will likely be undermined without treatment for his
combat-caused mental health condition. Yet, Sergeant Miller did not commit
a nonviolent or military-specific crime such as disrespect or absence without
leave; he committed a violent felony-level offense.
Applying the balancing test, the special trial counsel will likely
determine that the maintenance of good order and discipline is not excessive
considering the collateral consequences to Sergeant Miller. Thus, the special
trial counsel will likely decide to refer the case to general court-martial. This
case example illustrates that the modified proportionality test does not favor
a particular outcome and can be applied even in serious felony–level cases.
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CONCLUSION
The Army Judge Advocate General has called military justice decision
makers to “transform and succeed together.”300 Part of this “transformational
change”301 is the need to fundamentally rethink the approach to military
justice actions.
Too often, military justice decision makers consider only one variable
in what should be a complex, multivariable equation. While maintaining
good order and discipline is a worthy goal of the military justice system, it
is essential to truly embrace other variables to achieve holistic justice.302
Employing the modified proportionality test will enable military justice
decision makers to consider how their decisions affect accused service
members, victims, and society long-term, resulting in more informed
decisions. It will, in turn, bring their decision-making in line with the criteria
applied by every other federal prosecutor while maintaining the preeminent
importance of preserving good order and discipline. That will assist in
restoring legitimacy in the military justice system and prevent the permanent
divestiture of prosecutorial discretion from commanders. The proposed test
empowers military justice decision makers to embrace the “transformational
change” they are called to adopt.
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302 Id. (“Our Army’s military justice practice is critical to the good order and discipline of the force
and committed to protecting the rights of Soldiers.”).
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